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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case requires us to decide the preclusive effect of 
a state utility agency’s ruling, which has been affirmed by 
Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court and denied review by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court.  Although the Appellants, electric utility 
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companies Metropolitan Edison Co. (“Met-Ed”) and 
Pennsylvania Electric Co. (“Penelec”) (collectively, the 
“Companies”), also, in effect, invite us to review the agency’s 
ruling on the merits, we need not and do not take that step. 
 
The Companies’ end-game appears to be to recoup 
from their customers more than $250 million in costs 
associated with “line losses” – i.e., energy that is lost when 
electricity travels over power lines – and interest related to 
those costs.  For reasons we will explain, the Companies’ line 
loss costs had increased pursuant to a mandate by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), and the 
Companies’ ability to recover those costs depended on 
whether line-loss costs were classified as a cost of electricity 
generation or as a cost of electricity transmission on their 
customers’ utility bills.  In a prior proceeding, the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) rejected 
the Companies’ proposal to classify line-loss costs as a cost 
of transmission, thereby preventing the Companies from 
passing those costs through to their customers.  The 
Companies then pressed their arguments and lost in the 
Pennsylvania state courts and were denied review by the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 
The Companies now seek declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief in federal court against the PUC and its 
Commissioners in their official capacities, which would 
effectively set aside the result of the earlier state proceeding.  
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that the Companies’ unsuccessful pursuit 
of relief in the state proceeding precluded their effort to claim 
relief in federal court.  In short, none of the Companies’ 
claims survived application of the doctrine of issue 
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preclusion.  We agree and will affirm the District Court’s 
order of dismissal. 
 
I. BACKGROUND
1
 
 
To understand the issues raised in this appeal, it is 
helpful to first look at the legislative and administrative 
framework of electricity regulation and how that framework 
affects the parties before us. 
 
A. The Federal Power Act and the Filed Rate 
 Doctrine 
 
In 1935, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act 
(“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., which authorized “federal 
regulation of the expanding business of transmitting and 
selling electric power in interstate commerce.”  New York v. 
FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  As it stands today, the FPA grants FERC 
jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale 
in interstate commerce,” 16 U.S.C. § 824(a), and requires 
“[a]ll rates and charges … subject to the jurisdiction of the 
                                              
1
 Consistent with our standard of review for dismissal 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the facts 
from the Companies’ amended complaint are taken as true.  
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 322 (2007).  We also consider the documents 
incorporated by reference in the amended complaint.  Id. 
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Commission” to be “just and reasonable,” id. § 824d(a).2  The 
scope of that authority, broad though it is, is meant “to extend 
only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by 
the States.”  Id. § 824(a). 
 
The so-called “filed rate doctrine” is an application of 
the FPA’s statutory grant of authority to FERC.  See Borough 
of Ellwood City v. FERC, 583 F.2d 642, 648 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(calling the filed rate doctrine “not so much a judicially 
created ‘doctrine’ as an application of explicit statutory 
language”).  It may be understood for our purposes as the rule 
that “interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by 
FERC must be given binding effect by state utility 
commissions determining intrastate rates.”  Nantahala Power 
& Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986).  The 
filed rate doctrine thus “concern[s] the pre-emptive impact of 
federal jurisdiction … on state regulation.”  Miss. Power & 
Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988).  The 
doctrine of federal pre-emption, in turn, is rooted in the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which provides that 
federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land[,] … any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see also 
Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 963 (stating that the application of the 
filed rate doctrine to state tribunals is “a matter of enforcing 
the Supremacy Clause”). 
                                              
2
 The FPA originally vested authority in the Federal 
Power Commission, but that commission was reorganized 
and renamed FERC in 1977.  Department of Energy 
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 204, 91 Stat. 565, 571 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7134). 
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B. The Market for Electricity 
 
Before the passage of the FPA, electricity was usually 
sold by vertically integrated electric utilities that controlled 
their own generators, transmission lines, and local distribution 
networks.
3
  New York, 535 U.S. at 5; see also ARIPPA v. Pa. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 792 A.2d 636, 642 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2002) (noting that, historically, electric utilities in 
Pennsylvania were vertically integrated).  Services were 
typically “bundled” together, “meaning consumers paid a 
single price for generation, transmission, and distribution.”  
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 
1363 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2802(13) (stating that the same was the case in 
Pennsylvania).  “Although there were some interconnections 
among utilities, most operated as separate, local monopolies 
subject to state or local regulation.”  New York, 535 U.S. at 5. 
 
Advances in technology since the enactment of the 
FPA have resulted in “[t]ransmission grids [that] are now 
largely interconnected, which means that ‘any electricity that 
                                              
3
 In contrast with a horizontally integrated monopoly, 
which relates to consolidation of market power “at the same 
level of market structure,” a vertically integrated monopoly 
consolidates “different levels of the market structure,” such as 
electricity generation, transmission, and distribution facilities 
and services.  Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 
131 (2d Cir. 1978); cf. Sitkin Smelting & Refining Co. v. FMC 
Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 446 (3d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing 
horizontal and vertical price-fixing). 
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enters the grid immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of 
energy that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.’”  
N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting New York, 535 U.S. at 7).  “[T]he 
development of a national, interconnected grid has made it 
possible for a generator in one state to serve customers in 
another, thus opening the door to potential competition that 
did not previously exist.”  Id.  Nevertheless, electric utilities 
maintained ownership of transmission lines, and, thus, “the 
ability to stifle competition from new generators by 
‘refus[ing] to deliver energy produced by competitors or [by] 
deliver[ing] competitors’ power on terms and conditions less 
favorable than those they appl[ied] to their own 
transmissions.’”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting New 
York, 535 U.S. at 8-9).  As a result, for many years, 
monopolistic tendencies still restrained competition in the 
market for electricity. 
 
In 1996, FERC issued Order No. 888, a landmark 
ruling aimed at encouraging competition and lowering 
electricity rates.  See Promoting Wholesale Competition 
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities,  61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 
(May 10, 1996) [hereinafter Order No. 888], aff’d in relevant 
part, Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom. New York v. FERC, 
535 U.S. 1 (2002).  Significantly for this case, that Order 
requires the “unbundling” of wholesale generation and 
wholesale transmission services.  Id. at 21,558, 21,571, 
21,577-78.  Each electric utility must apply the same rate for 
wholesale transmission services to itself and others so as to 
provide open access to transmission services.  Id. at 21,541.  
Although FERC noted that unbundling retail services would 
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also be helpful to encouraging competition, Order No. 888 
only required the unbundling of wholesale transmission from 
wholesale generation.  Id. at 21,577. 
 
That same year, Pennsylvania enacted the Electricity 
Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act (the 
“Electric Competition Act”), 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2801 
et seq., which deregulated the business of electricity 
generation within the Commonwealth.  The Electric 
Competition Act was designed to promote competition in the 
electricity market and lower retail rates for electric energy.  
See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2802(4), (7) (noting the 
relatively high rates for electricity in Pennsylvania and the 
importance of transitioning to “greater competition in the 
electricity generation market”); see also ARIPPA, 792 A.2d at 
642 (stating the rationale behind the Electric Competition 
Act).  The Act “requires electric utilities to unbundle their 
rates and services and to provide open access over their 
transmission and distribution systems to allow competitive 
suppliers to generate and sell electricity directly to consumers 
in this Commonwealth.”  66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2802(14).  
Under the law, customers in Pennsylvania can purchase 
generation services directly from licensed “electric generation 
suppliers” rather than just from electric utilities.  Id.  Electric 
utilities, however, continue to provide the transmission and 
distribution of electricity, and “[i]f consumers d[o] not choose 
to or [a]re unable to purchase power from another supplier, 
the local utility [i]s still required to provide electricity to them 
as the Provider of Last Resort.”4  ARIPPA, 792 A.2d at 642 
(citing 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2802(16)). 
                                              
4
 The Electric Competition Act calls electric utilities 
“electric distribution companies” since they do not 
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As a result of introducing competition into the market 
for electricity generation services, the Electric Competition 
Act left electric utilities with “transition,” or “stranded,” 
costs, which are defined as “known and measurable” 
generation-related costs that “traditionally would be 
recoverable under a regulated environment but which may not 
be recoverable in a competitive electric generation market 
and which the [PUC] determines will remain following 
mitigation by the electric utility.”5  66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2803 (defining “[t]ransition or stranded costs”).  In other 
words, stranded costs are costs that were incurred while an 
electric utility developed as a generator and supplier of power 
within a regulated market but that will no longer be 
recoverable in a more competitive market.  Indianapolis 
Power & Light Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 711 A.2d 1071, 
1074 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998); see also Roger A. Greenbaum, 
Annotation, Recovery of “Stranded Costs” by Utilities, 80 
A.L.R. 6th 1 (2012) (“‘Stranded costs’ represent that portion 
                                                                                                     
necessarily provide customers with direct generation services 
anymore.  See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2803 (defining “[e]lectric 
distribution company”).  For ease of reference, we will 
continue to refer to them as “local” or “electric” utilities. 
5
 Under the Electric Competition Act, electric utilities 
have a “duty to mitigate generation-related transition or 
stranded costs to the extent practicable,” which may include 
efforts such as accelerating the depreciation and amortization 
of existing generation assets, minimizing new capital 
spending on generation assets, and maximizing market 
revenues from existing generation assets.  66 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 2808(c)(4). 
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of … a utility’s generation assets not yet recovered through 
[regulated rates] that has become unrecoverable in a 
deregulated environment.”).  For example, stranded costs may 
include a long-term investment in a generation facility that is 
no longer used due to deregulation of the market or other 
transition costs like the cost of retraining employees.  66 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2803; see also PECO Energy Co. v. 
Commonwealth, 919 A.2d 188, 189 n.2 (Pa. 2007) (“Stranded 
costs … often [involve] assets with high construction costs 
which were due to be recuperated through the rate guaranteed 
under the previous monopoly system and which now will 
operate at a loss.”); Indianapolis Power & Light, 711 A.2d at 
1074 n.4 (explaining the main categories of stranded costs).  
The Electric Competition Act allows electric utilities to 
recover certain stranded costs through a “charge applied to 
the bill of every customer accessing the transmission or 
distribution network,” separate from the charge for the actual 
amount of electricity consumed.  ARIPPA, 792 A.2d at 643 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2803, 2806(c), 2808). 
 
To ease transition to a competitive market, the Electric 
Competition Act required electric utilities in the 
Commonwealth to submit “restructuring plans,” including 
proposed rate schedules and plans for the recovery of 
stranded costs, for approval by the PUC.  66 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2806(d)-(f).  The Act outlined some restructuring standards, 
such as “caps” on service rates for certain periods of time in 
exchange for electric utilities being able to recover their 
stranded costs.  Id. § 2804(4).  The rate caps allowed 
customers to obtain electricity at the capped rates, which put 
downward pressure on any market rate above that level.  Cf. 
ARIPPA, 792 A.2d at 643 (noting that customers would buy 
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from an electric utility as the provider of last resort if market 
rates rose above the capped rates).  Electric utilities could 
seek approval from the PUC for exceptions to the rate-cap 
standards.  66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2804(4)(iii). 
 
C. The Companies’ Settlement Agreement 
 
The Companies provide electricity and associated 
services to customers in their prescribed territories within 
Pennsylvania.  Pursuant to passage of the Electric 
Competition Act, they filed restructuring plans with the PUC 
in 1997.  In 1998, they jointly and voluntarily entered into an 
omnibus settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”) 
that resolved disputes related to their restructuring plans and 
to pending litigation in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Of importance in the 
present matter, the Companies agreed to caps on 
“Transmission and Distribution (T&D) Charges” through 
December 31, 2004, as well as caps on “Generation rates” 
through December 31, 2010.  (J.A. at 115.)  Compared to the 
standard time-frames for rate caps under the Electric 
Competition Act, the periods for those agreed-upon rate caps 
represented extensions of three-and-a-half years on the 
transmission rate cap and five years on the generation rate 
cap.  66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2804(4)(i), (ii).  In exchange 
for accepting those extensions, the Companies were given 
additional time to recover certain stranded costs from their 
customers.  The PUC entered a final order approving the 
Settlement Agreement in October 1998.
6
   
                                              
6
 Upon a challenge filed by a Pennsylvania state 
representative, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 
upheld the PUC’s final order approving the terms of the 
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D. The Companies’ Line-Loss Costs 
 
The Companies’ distribution facilities are connected to 
an interstate transmission grid that is overseen by PJM 
Interconnection, LLC (“PJM”).  PJM is a regional 
transmission organization, a voluntary association “to which 
transmission providers … transfer operational control of their 
facilities for the purpose of efficient coordination” of the 
wholesale electricity market.  Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. 
Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1., 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008).  
Among other things, PJM ensures that there is a sufficient 
amount of electricity in its regional transmission system, 
which reaches the District of Columbia and thirteen Mid-
Atlantic and Midwest states, including Pennsylvania.  N.J. 
Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 79, 82.  FERC regulates the 
wholesale rates that PJM charges the Companies, and those 
rates are set forth in PJM’s Open Access Transmission Tariff 
(“PJM’s Tariff”), which is on file with FERC.  Among the 
costs that the Companies are billed by PJM are the costs for 
line losses.
7
  As noted earlier, line losses represent the energy 
                                                                                                     
Settlement Agreement.  George v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
735 A.2d 1282 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). 
7
 The parties refer to lines losses interchangeably as 
“line losses,” “marginal transmission line losses,” “marginal 
transmission losses,” and “generation line losses.”  (See, e.g., 
Appellants’ Opening Br. at 32, 35; Br. of PUC and PUC 
Commissioners at 9.)  Because the dispute underlying this 
case relates to whether the cost of those losses should be 
billed to the Companies’ customers as a cost of transmission 
or, instead, a cost of generation, we will use the neutral term 
“line losses” to refer to such loss of energy. 
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that is lost when electricity travels over power lines.  PJM 
bills the Companies for line losses as a discrete line item 
within the charge for “transmission” service.  (J.A. at 41-42 
(Amended Complaint); id. at 481, 483, 486, 488, 191-92 
(PJM’s Tariff).) 
 
Until June 30, 2007, PJM calculated and billed for line 
losses using what is called the “average loss” methodology.  
See Atl. City Elec. Co. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC (Atlantic 
City I), 115 FERC ¶ 61,132, p. 61,473 (2006), reh’g denied, 
117 FERC ¶ 61,169.  As the name suggests, PJM charged its 
customers for line losses “equal to the average loss cost” – 
PJM recovered line-loss costs by allocating the cost to all of 
its customers equally.  Id. at 61,473.  As a result, line-loss 
costs did not depend on the distance between the point of 
electricity generation and the point of electricity delivery.  Id. 
at 61,473-74. 
 
On March 2, 2006, several electric utilities (but not the 
Companies) filed a complaint with FERC alleging that, under 
an agreement appended to PJM’s Tariff, PJM was required to 
switch from the average loss methodology to a “marginal 
loss” methodology to calculate the cost of line losses.  Id. at 
61,473.  “Under the marginal loss method, the effect of losses 
on the marginal cost of delivering energy is factored into the 
energy price … at each location.”  Id. at 61,474.  Thus, 
“[o]ther things being equal, customers near generation centers 
pay prices that reflect smaller marginal loss costs while 
customers far from generation centers pay prices that reflect 
higher marginal loss costs.”  Id.; see also Sacramento Mun. 
Util. Dist. v. FERC, 616 F.3d 520, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(describing the marginal loss methodology as a rate structure 
in which “prices are designed to reflect the least-cost of 
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meeting an incremental [energy] demand at each location on 
the grid, and thus prices vary based on location and time”).  
After issuing notice of the complaint, FERC solicited 
comments from numerous electric utilities and customer 
coalitions.  Atlantic City I, 115 FERC at 61,474-77.   
 
In an order issued in 2006, FERC held that the 
agreement appended to PJM’s Tariff required PJM to use the 
marginal loss methodology once it was technologically 
feasible to do so and that PJM had conceded that it possessed 
the necessary technology.  Id. at 61,477.  FERC also noted 
that using marginal loss pricing would result in cost savings 
to PJM and efficiencies in resource allocation.  Id. at 61,474, 
61,477-78.  Accordingly, FERC required PJM to switch from 
using the average loss methodology to the marginal loss 
methodology of calculating line losses.  Id. at 61,478.  The 
Companies did not participate in the comments process 
before FERC or challenge the resulting order.  Id. at 61,474-
77. 
 
A few months later, FERC denied rehearing requests 
but granted a request to delay implementation of the marginal 
loss methodology to June 2007.  Atl. City Elec. Co. v. PJM 
Interconnection, LLC (Atlantic City II), 117 FERC ¶ 61,169, 
pp. 61,858, 61,861 (2006).  The Companies did not directly 
challenge that order either; in fact, they assert that “no one 
did.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 36.)  PJM’s 
implementation of FERC’s orders to change the calculation of 
line-loss costs, which orders we will refer to collectively as 
the Atlantic City decision, decreased the line-loss costs for 
some electric utilities.  However, it increased the line-loss 
costs that PJM billed to the Companies.   
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Not surprisingly, the Companies eventually sought to 
recover their increased line-loss costs by asking the PUC to 
allow them to pass the expense through to their customers.  A 
“transmission rider,” which was approved by the PUC in 
2006 after the Companies’ transmission rate cap had lapsed, 
allowed the Companies to pass through various proposed 
transmission costs to their customers and to engage in an 
annual updating and reconciliation process in order to recover 
projected transmission costs and adjust for the over- or under-
collection of past transmission costs.  Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n 
v. Metro. Edison Co., Nos. R-00061366C0001 et al., 2007 
WL 496359 (Pa. PUC Jan. 11, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Met-Ed 
Indus. Users Grp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 960 A.2d 189 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).  Under that annual process, the 
Companies proposed for the first time in April 2008 to charge 
their customers for the higher line-loss costs that the 
Companies incurred after PJM’s implementation of the 
Atlantic City decision.  Because the generation rate cap under 
the Settlement Agreement was still in effect at that time, the 
Companies could only recover the line-loss costs if granted 
approval to bill them to customers as a cost of transmission. 
 
A. The PUC Order 
 
Pennsylvania’s Office of Consumer Advocate and 
Office of Small Business Advocate
8
 and two groups known as 
                                              
8
 The briefing refers to the “Office of Small Business 
Advocate.”  (See, e.g., Br. of PUC and PUC Commissioners 
at 9.)  We understand that to be an agency of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
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the Met-Ed Industrial Users Group and the Penelec Industrial 
Users Alliance (collectively, the “Customer Groups”) – all 
representing the interests of various customers – filed 
complaints before the PUC to contest the Companies’ 
proposed rate increase.  They argued that line-loss costs 
should properly be viewed as a generation cost, not a 
transmission cost, and, thus, could not be increased due to the 
Settlement Agreement’s generation rate cap in effect through 
the end of 2010.  The Customer Groups’ complaints were 
consolidated for a hearing before a PUC administrative law 
judge (“ALJ”).9  An evidentiary hearing was held after the 
Companies and Customer Groups completed briefing.   
 
The ALJ recommended dismissing the Customer 
Groups’ complaints and approving the Companies’ requests 
to recover line-loss costs as a transmission cost.  In re Pa. 
Elec. Co. Transmission Serv. Charge, Nos. M-2008-2036188 
et al., 2009 Pa. PUC LEXIS 2328 (July 24, 2009).  The 
Customer Groups filed exceptions to the ALJ’s 
recommendation, triggering review by the Commissioners of 
the PUC.  See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 332(h) (providing 
procedure for excepting to an ALJ’s recommendation). 
 
The Customer Groups argued to the PUC that line-loss 
costs should not be billed to them as transmission costs 
because (1) line losses have historically been recognized as 
part of the cost of electricity generation; (2) how PJM bills 
                                              
9
 Before consolidation, the PUC had instituted an 
investigation of Met-Ed’s proposed transmission charges and 
conditionally approved Penelec’s proposed charges, pending 
resolution of the complaints.   
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the Companies for line losses is irrelevant to whether those 
losses should be billed to the Companies’ customers as a 
generation or transmission cost; and (3) the Companies 
themselves have historically treated line-loss costs as 
generation costs.  The Companies responded by (1) 
emphasizing how line losses are related to transmission, i.e., 
as electricity is transmitted over longer distances, line losses 
increase; (2) pointing to the FERC-approved definition of 
“transmission losses” in PJM’s Tariff;10 and (3) arguing that 
PJM bills the Companies for line losses as a cost of 
transmission service.  The Companies also claimed that they 
did not initially seek to recover line-loss costs as a 
transmission cost because, at the time, FERC had not yet 
mandated the use of marginal loss pricing.   
 
The PUC in a split decision entered March 3, 2010 (the 
“PUC Order”) ultimately rejected all of the Companies’ 
arguments and agreed with the Customer Groups.  The PUC 
did not adopt the ALJ’s recommendation that line losses be 
considered a transmission cost, concluding instead that the 
Companies’ line losses were generation costs subject to the 
Settlement Agreement’s generation rate cap that was in effect 
through 2010.  As the merits of the PUC Order are not before 
us, suffice it to say that the PUC thoroughly reviewed all of 
the Companies and the Customer Groups’ arguments.  By a 
three-to-two vote of the Commissioners, the agency required 
                                              
10
 As defined in PJM’s Tariff, “[t]ransmission losses 
refer to the loss of energy in the transmission of electricity 
from generation resources to load, which is dissipated as heat 
through transformers, transmission lines and other 
transmission facilities.”  (J.A. at 481.) 
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the Companies to file tariff supplements consistent with the 
majority’s decision.11   
 
B. Review of the PUC Order 
 
The Companies petitioned the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court for review of the PUC Order to the 
extent it denied their request to classify line-loss costs as a 
transmission cost.
12
  In June 2011, the Commonwealth Court, 
sitting en banc, affirmed that aspect of the PUC Order in a 
unanimous opinion and order.  The Commonwealth Court 
                                              
11
 Commissioner Powelson filed a dissenting 
statement, saying that the Companies’ line-loss costs were a 
cost of transmission because, inter alia, they were not 
expressly included as a generation cost in the Settlement 
Agreement, and including them in transmission costs would 
be consistent with FERC’s view of line losses.  However, he 
was careful to note that “[t]his is not to say that … line losses 
cannot be included within generation rates,” and he agreed 
with the PUC majority that FERC’s treatment of line losses 
“certainly is not controlling on whether the [PUC] should 
allow for the recovery of such losses in retail rates.”  (J.A. at 
165.) 
12
 The Commonwealth Court consolidated the 
Companies’ petition with a cross-petition for review filed by 
Pennsylvania’s Office of Small Business Advocate that 
sought review of the PUC Order to the extent it allowed the 
Companies to recover certain interest charges.  The 
Commonwealth Court vacated the PUC Order with respect to 
that issue, which is immaterial to this appeal.   
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reviewed whether the PUC’s findings of fact – “including the 
[PUC’s] finding that line loss costs were and are being 
recovered in [the] Companies’ generation rates” – were 
supported by substantial evidence.  (J.A. at 176.)  The court 
also reviewed whether the PUC erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that line-loss costs are a generation cost.  It found 
no reversible error in either regard.   
 
Important for purposes of this appeal, the 
Commonwealth Court addressed the Companies’ argument 
that classifying line-loss costs as a generation cost for 
purposes of retail billing “violates the Filed Rate Doctrine and 
is inconsistent with … FERC’s characterization of line 
losses.”  (J.A. at 183.)  The Companies had cited FERC 
decisions that allegedly treated line losses as a cost of 
transmission, but the Commonwealth Court held that those 
decisions “do not unambiguously state that such costs are 
transmission-related.”  (J.A. at 188.)  As the court saw it, 
several of those FERC decisions included language tying line 
losses to the costs of generating electricity.  The court thus 
concluded that FERC’s decisions did not create any “direct 
conflict” with the classification of the Companies’ line-loss 
costs as generation costs.  (J.A. at 189.) 
 
Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court held that, for 
two reasons, there was no impermissible “trapping” of the 
Companies’ costs.  Cost trapping, in this context, refers to a 
state “bar[ring] regulated utilities from passing through to 
retail consumers FERC-mandated wholesale rates.”  Miss. 
Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 372.  First, the court stated that 
the Companies’ trapping argument was “premised on the 
[rejected] assumption that line loss costs are transmission-
related.”  (J.A. at 191.)  Second, it determined that any 
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alleged trapping was resolved by the Settlement Agreement 
“because [the] Companies voluntarily extended th[e] 
[generation] rate cap through December 31, 2010 … in 
exchange for recovering stranded costs,” thus assuming the 
risk that any increased costs would not be recoverable.  (Id.)  
The Commonwealth Court therefore affirmed the PUC Order 
in relevant part, holding that the Order was not inconsistent 
with FERC precedent, did not run afoul of the filed rate 
doctrine, and did not improperly trap the Companies’ costs.   
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently denied 
the Companies’ petition for allowance of appeal, and the 
United States Supreme Court denied the Companies’ petition 
for a writ of certiorari.  The Commonwealth Court’s decision 
(the “State Decision”) affirming the classification of line-loss 
costs for retail billing purposes thus became final. 
 
C. The Federal Action 
 
On July 13, 2011, while their petition for review 
before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was pending, the 
Companies filed the present action in the District Court, 
naming as defendants the PUC and PUC Commissioners 
Robert F. Powelson, John F. Coleman, Jr., Pamela A. Witmer, 
Wayne E. Gardner,
13
 and James H. Cawley in their official 
                                              
13
 Gardner has since been replaced as a defendant, 
pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, with PUC Commissioner Gladys M. Brown.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) (providing that, if an officeholder 
who is sued in his or her official capacity ceases to hold 
office, the officeholder’s successor is automatically 
substituted as a party). 
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capacities (collectively, the “PUC Defendants”).  As 
originally filed, the suit claimed that the PUC Defendants had 
violated the FPA and the filed rate doctrine, as well as the 
Companies’ property interests under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Companies later filed an amended 
complaint to add a claim that the Electric Competition Act is 
unconstitutional as applied.  Pennsylvania’s Office of Small 
Business Advocate, the Met-Ed Industrial Users Group, and 
the Penelec Industrial Users Alliance filed motions to 
intervene, which the District Court granted, permitting them 
“to intervene as defendants.”  (J.A. at 5 (Dkt. 41).)  
 
The gravamen of the Companies’ amended complaint 
is that the outcome of the state proceeding resulted in 
unlawful trapping of the line-loss costs that PJM charged 
them pursuant to FERC-approved tariffs.  The Companies 
ultimately seek to recover the line-loss costs they incurred 
between 2007 and 2010.
14
  Those disputed costs, including 
interest, allegedly total more than $250 million.
15
   
 
Count I of the Companies’ amended complaint asserts 
that the alleged cost-trapping violates the FPA and the filed 
rate doctrine.  Count II alleges that the PUC Order “imposes a 
confiscatory rate on the Companies” by depriving them of a 
                                              
14
 There is no dispute that the State Decision leaves 
them free to recover line-loss costs after the Settlement 
Agreement’s generation rate cap lapsed at the end of 2010. 
15
 According to the Companies’ amended complaint in 
this action, the amount that they seek to recover exceeds their 
combined net income in 2009 and 2010.   
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property interest in recovering line-loss costs and, thus, 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, by extension, the FPA’s requirement that 
rates be just and reasonable.  (J.A. at 50.)  Count III claims 
that the Electric Competition Act is unconstitutional as 
applied because it is pre-empted by federal law.  In sum, the 
Companies allege that, by barring them from recovering the 
line-loss costs that PJM charged them under a FERC-
mandated methodology, the PUC Order violates the filed rate 
doctrine, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the FPA, and, to the extent the 
PUC and the Commonwealth Court relied on the Electric 
Competition Act, that statute, as applied, is pre-empted by 
federal law. 
 
The PUC Defendants moved to dismiss the amended 
complaint,
16
 arguing that the Companies’ claims are barred by 
issue preclusion, claim preclusion, abstention principles, and 
judicial estoppel.
17
  With respect to preclusion, the 
                                              
16
 The District Court initially denied the motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint without prejudice to renew, 
pending resolution of the certiorari petition in the United 
States Supreme Court from the state proceeding.  The PUC 
Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss after the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.   
17
 The PUC Defendants also raised the Full Faith and 
Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, as a separate ground for 
dismissal in the District Court.  However, as we will explain, 
that statute directs us to Pennsylvania’s law on preclusion.  
So, like the District Court, we will not examine the Full Faith 
and Credit Statute as a separate basis for dismissal. 
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Companies responded with three arguments for why their 
claims are not barred by preclusion principles: the state 
proceeding was legislative, rather than judicial, in nature; the 
Commonwealth Court reviewed the PUC’s ruling under the 
wrong standard; and the PUC Order was facially pre-empted 
by FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.     
 
After hearing oral argument on the renewed motion to 
dismiss, the District Court dismissed all of the Companies’ 
claims on the basis of issue preclusion.  The Companies then 
timely filed this appeal.
18
 
 
                                              
18
 The Met-Ed Industrial Users Group and Penelec 
Industrial Users Alliance filed a brief before us as 
Intervenors-Appellees.  In it, they adopt and join all of the 
PUC Defendants’ arguments and emphasize that “the []PUC 
appropriately enforced the Companies’ obligation under the 
… Settlement Agreement.”  (Intervenors-Appellees’ Br. at 
14-15.)  For simplicity, we only cite to the PUC Defendants’ 
briefing, and when we refer to the PUC Defendants in the text 
from this point on, that reference includes the Met-Ed 
Industrial Users Group and the Penelec Industrial Users 
Alliance as well.  Pennsylvania’s Office of Small Business 
Advocate did not file a brief on appeal. 
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III. DISCUSSION
19
 
  
At the outset, it is worth emphasizing what is and is not at 
issue here.  The question before us is whether the State 
Decision – i.e., the Commonwealth Court’s decision that the 
PUC’s classification of line-loss costs did not violate the filed 
rate doctrine or impermissibly trap costs – bars litigation of 
the claims in this federal action.  It is not whether the PUC 
correctly classified the Companies’ line-loss costs as 
generation costs in the first instance. 
 
                                              
19
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3).  The Companies argue that the Court 
also had jurisdiction under 16 U.S.C. § 825p, which provides 
federal district courts with jurisdiction to “enforce any 
liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of [the 
FPA] or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.”  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review of a district court’s order of dismissal under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Atkinson v. 
Lafayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 2006), including 
the application of issue preclusion, Jean Alexander 
Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248-49 
(3d Cir. 2006).  “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss 
may be granted only if, accepting the well-pleaded allegations 
in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those 
allegations ‘could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.’”  
Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 
(2007)). 
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The Companies offer several arguments for denying 
the State Decision any preclusive effect, based on what they 
call exceptions to the application of the Full Faith and Credit 
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 29-
44.)  They also argue that the District Court misinterpreted 
the reach of the State Decision to preclude all of their claims.  
The PUC Defendants respond that the principles of issue 
preclusion properly bar the present case and, in the 
alternative, that dismissal would be proper under claim 
preclusion, abstention principles, and judicial estoppel.   
 
A. Issue Preclusion 
 
The District Court viewed the State Decision as having 
preclusive effect because the Commonwealth Court addressed 
the Companies’ arguments that the PUC Order violated the 
filed rate doctrine and impermissibly trapped costs.  Under 
the doctrine of issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral 
estoppel, “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law 
necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude 
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action 
involving a party to the first case.”  Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 94 (1980).  Federal courts give preclusive effect to 
issues decided by state courts, to “not only reduce 
unnecessary litigation and foster reliance on adjudication, but 
also promote the comity between state and federal courts that 
has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system.”  Id. 
at 95-96.  The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a 
subsequent federal lawsuit is determined by the Full Faith and 
Credit Statute, which provides, in relevant part, that state 
judicial proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit 
in every court within the United States … as they have by law 
or usage in the courts of such State … from which they are 
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taken.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738.  That statute has been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court to require a federal court to look to 
state law to determine the preclusive effect of a prior state 
judgment.  Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 
470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985). 
 
Here, there is no dispute that Pennsylvania’s 
preclusion law applies.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
established a five-prong test providing that issue preclusion 
will apply when: 
 
(1) the issue decided in the prior case is 
identical to the one presented in the later action; 
(2) there was a final adjudication on the merits; 
(3) the party against whom the plea is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party in the prior 
case; (4) the party … against whom the doctrine 
is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the prior proceeding; and (5) 
the determination in the prior proceeding was 
essential to the judgment.
[20]
   
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47, 
50-51 (Pa. 2005). 
 
 
                                              
20
 Some earlier Pennsylvania cases apply the same 
issue preclusion test but without the fifth prong regarding 
whether the prior determination was essential to the 
judgment.  E.g., Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (Pa. 
1996). 
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As noted before, Count I of the amended complaint 
alleges that the PUC Order trapped the Companies’ line 
losses in violation of the filed rate doctrine and, by extension, 
in violation of the FPA and the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.  The Companies do not appear to dispute that 
Count I meets all five of the requirements for issue preclusion 
under Pennsylvania law.  That is wise, since (1) the 
Commonwealth Court squarely decided that the PUC Order 
did not violate the filed rate doctrine or impermissibly trap 
costs; (2) the court’s decision was on the merits and final after 
both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court denied petitions to review the State 
Decision;
21
 (3) the Companies were parties to the underlying 
state proceeding; (4) the Companies were given the 
opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue, as they were 
represented by counsel, filed multiple briefs, pointed to 
evidence from the PUC proceeding, and presented oral 
argument to the en banc Commonwealth Court;
22
 and (5) the 
                                              
21
 The Companies argue that the State Decision was a 
legislative action rather than an adjudication.  We will 
address that argument when discussing the exceptions that 
they raise to the application of issue preclusion. 
22
 “A party has been denied a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate only when state procedures fall below the minimum 
requirements of due process as defined by federal law.”  
Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1074 (3d 
Cir. 1990).  Those minimum requirements may, depending on 
circumstances, include “the right to be represented by 
counsel, … present testimony and documentary evidence, and 
… subpoena and cross-examine witnesses.”  Rue v. K-Mart 
Corp., 713 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 1998); see also Rogin v. 
 29 
 
determination was essential to the judgment because, had the 
Commonwealth Court decided that there was a violation of 
the filed rate doctrine, it could not have affirmed the PUC 
Order as it did.  Absent some exception, Count I is therefore 
barred by issue preclusion. 
 
According to the Companies, however, their claims in 
Counts II and III – which allege a confiscatory taking and 
federal pre-emption of the Electric Competition Act, 
respectively – do not meet the five-prong issue preclusion test 
under Pennsylvania law.  They argue that those claims raise 
new issues that were not decided in the state proceedings and 
that the Companies were not given a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate them.  The PUC Defendants argue that the 
Companies failed to object to the application of issue 
preclusion to Counts II and III before the District Court, 
thereby waiving their arguments against preclusion of those 
two counts.  The PUC Defendants further submit that Counts 
II and III, like Count I, require adjudication of the very issues 
that were fully litigated and decided in the state proceedings.  
We consider the waiver argument first. 
 
                                                                                                     
Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 694 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that 
elements of procedural due process include whether there is 
notice, a neutral arbiter, an opportunity for oral argument, an 
opportunity to present evidence, an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses or respond to written evidence, and an 
explanatory decision based on the record). 
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1. Waiver 
 
 “[F]ailure to raise an issue in the district court 
constitutes a waiver of the argument.”  Gass v. V.I. Tel. 
Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  “We only depart from this rule 
when manifest injustice would result from a failure to 
consider a novel issue.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The Companies do not attempt to show that 
manifest injustice would result from a failure to consider their 
arguments regarding Counts II and III.  Rather, they claim 
that there is no waiver because they “provided [the PUC 
Defendants] with fair notice and the grounds on which Counts 
II and III separately rested.”  (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 24 
(citing Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheney, 515 F.3d 224, 233-35 
(3d Cir. 2008)).)  That argument misses the mark because, 
even if it were factually accurate, it relates to pleading 
requirements.  It does not show that the Companies preserved 
their arguments for appeal by raising them in the District 
Court, and indeed they did not. 
 
The Companies claim that they did not waive their 
arguments because their “[b]rief … explain[ed] why Counts 
II and III were not commingled with Count I.”  (Appellants’ 
Reply Br. at 25.)  But that argument is unavailing because the 
brief that they cite to is the opening brief before us, not 
anything that they filed in the District Court.
23
  The 
                                              
23
 The opening brief before us is the first time the 
Companies raised arguments regarding how issue preclusion 
might apply differently to Counts II and III.  As the PUC 
Defendants point out, the Companies did not even identify 
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Companies also argue that they did not litigate the merits of 
Count III in the state proceeding, but that is an argument that 
Count III is not precluded; it is not a justification for failing to 
raise arguments specific to Count III in response to the 
motion to dismiss in the District Court. 
 
The only colorable argument that the Companies make 
to rebut waiver is that the PUC and its Commissioners, in 
their motion to dismiss, “did not argue [in the first place] that 
Count II was barred by issue preclusion.”  (Appellants’ Reply 
Br. at 25.)  In that regard, the Companies are correct.  As a 
consequence, we are not prepared to say that they were 
required, at the risk of waiver, to argue that issue preclusion 
does not apply to Count II.  We will not consider the 
Companies’ issue preclusion arguments with respect to Count 
II waived.  The PUC and its Commissioners did, however, 
argue in the District Court that issue preclusion bars Counts I 
and III.  As the Companies did not attempt to distinguish 
Count III in the District Court in response to the issue 
preclusion arguments, they waived at least their arguments as 
to that count.
24
 
 
2. Issue preclusion analysis 
 
In any event, as the PUC Defendants argue, Counts II 
and III of the Companies’ amended complaint are both barred 
by issue preclusion, absent any exceptions that would 
                                                                                                     
those arguments in their Concise Summary of the Case filed 
before us.   
24
 For the reasons already discussed, issue preclusion 
does apply to Count I, absent any applicable exception. 
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preserve them.  Count II alleges that the PUC Order “imposes 
a confiscatory rate on the Companies in violation of the 
Constitution because it deprives the Companies of their 
property right to recover their federally-approved costs of 
providing electric service, which includes marginal 
transmission line loss charges, to their Pennsylvania 
customers.”  (J.A. at 50.)  Count II further alleges that the 
PUC Order is confiscatory because it violates the FPA’s 
requirement for rates to be just and reasonable.  In other 
words, Count II is premised on the success of the argument 
that the PUC Order violated the filed rate doctrine and, thus, 
impermissibly “trapped” the Companies’ line-loss costs – the 
same argument that the Companies raise in Count I and that is 
precluded by the State Decision, absent an applicable 
exception.  Without a legal determination that their costs were 
impermissibly “trapped,” the Companies have no basis for 
asserting an unconstitutional deprivation of any property 
interest.  Because Count II depends entirely on the same 
issues that were already litigated to finality in the state 
proceeding, it is foreclosed by issue preclusion. 
 
A similar fate would befall Count III, even if the 
Companies’ arguments regarding that count were not waived.  
Count III relates to the constitutionality of the Electric 
Competition Act as applied to the Companies, to the extent 
the PUC Order “disregard[ed] FERC orders or … 
interpret[ed] FERC tariffs” in violation of the filed rate 
doctrine.  (J.A. at 51.)  Although the constitutional challenge 
to the Electric Competition Act was not raised until the PUC 
made its decision, it depends, like Count II, on the Companies 
being able to establish that the PUC Order violated the filed 
rate doctrine.  Again, the State Decision expressly held that 
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there was no violation of the filed rate doctrine, so Count III 
would also be precluded, absent any exception.
25
 
 
B. Exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit 
Statute 
 
Although issue preclusion would typically foreclose 
their claims, the Companies argue that three exceptions to the 
Full Faith and Credit Statute apply to render the State 
Decision devoid of any preclusive effect: (1) the state 
proceeding was legislative rather than judicial in nature; (2) 
the Companies had a substantially higher burden of 
persuasion in the Commonwealth Court than they do in this 
federal action; and (3), under the filed rate doctrine, the PUC 
and the Commonwealth Court infringed on FERC’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.  [Appellants’ Opening Br. at 24-26.]  We are 
not persuaded that any of those exceptions apply to foreclose 
the application of issue preclusion in this case. 
 
                                              
25
 To the extent the Companies claim that they have 
not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate Counts II and III, 
that argument is unavailing.  While the Companies may not 
have litigated the claims set forth in Counts II and III in the 
state proceeding, they had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the underlying issues of whether classifying their line-
loss costs as a generation cost for retail billing purposes 
violated the filed rate doctrine or impermissibly trapped costs. 
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1. Whether the state proceeding was 
legislative or judicial in nature 
The Full Faith and Credit Statute, by its terms, applies 
only to “judicial proceedings.”  28 U.S.C. § 1738.   The 
Companies argue that the state proceeding was legislative, not 
judicial, in nature, so the Full Faith and Credit Statute – and 
the principles of preclusion that stem from it – do not apply.   
 
The parties do not dispute that the Supreme Court has 
counseled federal courts to defer to each state’s 
characterization of its own proceedings.  See Okla. Packing 
Co. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 7 (1940) (looking 
to “[t]he pronouncements of the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
concerning the character of … a [prior] determination”); 
Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 291 (1923) 
(“The Constitution of Oklahoma[] … gives an appeal to the 
Supreme Court of the State, acting in a legislative capacity … 
, with power to substitute a different order and to grant a 
supersedeas in the meantime.”); cf. Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line 
Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (“We shall assume that when[] 
… a state Constitution sees fit to unite legislative and judicial 
powers in a single hand, there is nothing to hinder, so far as 
the Constitution of the United States is concerned.”).  In 
addition, the Supreme Court in New Orleans Public Service, 
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350 
(1989), said that the proper characterization of an agency’s 
actions “depends not upon the character of the body but upon 
the character of the proceedings. … The nature of the final act 
determines the nature of the previous inquiry.”  Id. at 371 
(first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  NOPSI teaches that 
 
 35 
 
[a] judicial inquiry investigates, declares and 
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or 
past facts and under laws supposed already to 
exist.  That is its purpose and end.  Legislation 
on the other hand looks to the future and 
changes existing conditions by making a new 
rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part 
of those subject to its power. 
Id. at 370-71 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
The Companies argue that Pennsylvania has not 
clearly decided whether the Commonwealth Court’s review 
of a PUC order is legislative or judicial, while the PUC 
Defendants counter that the Pennsylvania Administrative Law 
and Procedure Act and the Pennsylvania Judicial Code 
unequivocally call appellate review of PUC proceedings 
“judicial.”  (PUC Defendants’ Br. at 44.)  The District Court 
concluded that the Commonwealth Court’s review of the 
PUC Order was judicial in nature because the Commonwealth 
Court’s authority to review PUC orders under 2 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 704 “is limited to determining whether a constitutional 
violation, an error of law, or a violation of PUC procedure has 
occurred and whether necessary findings of fact are supported 
by substantial evidence.”26  (J.A. at 30 (quoting Popowsky v. 
                                              
26
 Under 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 704, which relates to 
“Judicial Review of Commonwealth Agency Action”: 
The [reviewing] court shall hear the appeal 
without a jury on the record certified by the 
Commonwealth agency.  After hearing, the 
court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall 
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Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 910 A.2d 38, 48 (Pa. 2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  The District Court further found 
support for the judicial nature of the proceeding in “the 
Commonwealth Court[’s] reli[ance] upon past facts (as found 
in the proceeding before the []PUC) and existing law (as the 
Commonwealth Court interpreted it) to resolve a challenge to 
the legality of a prior action (the []PUC … Order).”  (Id.) 
 
The Companies contend that the District Court’s 
reasoning was erroneous because “[i]t cannot be true that 
[the] commonplace standard of agency review – one that 
applies to both ratemaking and non-ratemaking agencies alike 
– makes the Commonwealth Court’s decision here judicial.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 51.)  In other words, they argue 
that the scope of the Commonwealth Court’s review, alone, 
cannot determine whether such review is judicial or 
legislative in nature.  That argument fails, however, because 
                                                                                                     
find that the adjudication is in violation of the 
constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in 
accordance with law, or that the provisions of 
Subchapter A of Chapter 5 (relating to practice 
and procedure of Commonwealth agencies) 
have been violated in the proceedings before the 
agency, or that any finding of fact made by the 
agency and necessary to support its adjudication 
is not supported by substantial evidence.  If the 
adjudication is not affirmed, the court may enter 
any order authorized by 42 Pa. C.S. § 706 
(relating to disposition of appeals). 
2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 704. 
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the scope of agency review is not the sole basis for 
concluding that the State Decision was judicial rather than 
legislative.  Other aspects of the state proceeding also indicate 
that it was judicial in nature. 
 
The Companies rely on two Pennsylvania cases from 
the 1950s to argue that Pennsylvania courts consider their 
review of a state agency’s rate-making to be legislative in 
nature.  The two are a 1954 Pennsylvania Superior Court 
case, Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, which includes the comment that “[r]ate making 
is an exercise of the legislative power, delegated to the 
Commission,” 107 A.2d 745, 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954), and a 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion from 1956, 
Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, that 
says “[t]he [United States Supreme] Court has permitted 
resort to a federal court of equity where a state was enforcing 
confiscatory rates and by its law precluded a stay … until the 
state courts ‘acting in a legislative capacity’ had taken final 
action,” 125 A.2d 755, 763 (1956) (quoting Aircraft & Diesel 
Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 773 n.38 (1947)).  
Duquesne, however, relates to the nature of certain PUC rate-
making; it does not dictate that all PUC actions are legislative 
in nature, let alone hold that the Commonwealth Court’s 
review of a PUC decision is a legislative act.  And the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Torquato simply recognized 
that a state court acting in a legislative capacity does not 
necessarily establish precedent that prevents resort to a 
federal court; it did not hold that review of a PUC action is by 
definition legislative. 
 
We recognized in Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 837 F.2d 600 (3d 
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Cir. 1988), that PUC proceedings may be judicial in nature: 
“When a state agency acting in a judicial capacity resolves 
disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties 
have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts 
must give the agency factfinding the same preclusive effect to 
which it would be entitled in the state’s courts.”  Id. at 611 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, Pennsylvania law recognizes 
that PUC action and subsequent court review can be judicial 
in nature.  See 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 704 (Pennsylvania 
Administrative Law and Procedure Act describing the various 
dispositions when a court reviews a state agency’s 
“adjudication”).  As the PUC Defendants point out, PUC 
decisions can be “the product of a quasi-judicial, on-the-
record proceeding that includes a presiding ALJ who has the 
power to administer oaths, conduct evidentiary hearings, 
allow for cross-examination, rule on motions, review briefs 
submitted by the parties, and issue recommended decisions 
with findings of fact and conclusions of law.”  (PUC 
Defendants’ Br. at 44 (citing 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 331; 2 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 504-507).)  By implication, if a state 
agency proceeding is judicial, appellate review of that 
proceeding is also judicial. 
 
A straightforward application of the distinction 
between judicial and legislative inquiry outlined in NOPSI 
confirms that the Commonwealth Court decision at issue here 
is judicial in nature.  As the District Court held, “the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania did not conduct an 
independent, forward-looking ... investigation.”  (J.A. at 30.)  
Instead, the Commonwealth Court, like the PUC, referred to 
and endeavored to enforce (whether correctly or not is 
immaterial at this juncture) the pre-existing Settlement 
Agreement.  The Commonwealth Court further made a 
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determination specific to the Companies.  It determined that 
there was no violation of the filed rate doctrine with respect to 
how the PUC required the Companies to classify their line 
losses, which involved a review of the record regarding how 
the Companies, specifically, had treated line losses in the 
past.  At bottom, both the PUC and the Commonwealth Court 
adjudicated the adversarial dispute between the Customer 
Groups and the Companies after considering those parties’ 
respective legal arguments.  We have no difficulty holding 
that the state proceeding was judicial, not legislative.  The 
nature of the state proceeding therefore does not bar the 
application of issue preclusion in this case. 
 
2. Whether the Companies’ burdens before 
the Commonwealth Court and in the 
instant case are different 
The Companies also argue that the so-called 
“difference-in-burden exception” bars giving the State 
Decision any preclusive effect.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 
44.)  They rely on Section 28(4) of the Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments, which states that preclusion does not apply 
when  
 
[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought 
had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion 
with respect to the issue in the initial action than 
in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted 
to his adversary; or the adversary has a 
significantly heavier burden than he had in the 
first action. 
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Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4) (1982).  The 
Companies do not argue that the burden of proof ever shifted 
to their adversaries.  (See Oral Argument Transcript (“Tr.”) at 
29:11-12 (“We have the burden – either way we have the 
burden.”).)  Rather, they argue that, in reviewing the PUC 
Order, the Commonwealth Court applied the wrong standard 
of review and placed a substantially more onerous burden of 
persuasion on them than the Companies would face in this 
action.  The PUC Defendants respond by arguing that “the 
use of the [difference-in-burden] exception is not ‘well-
established’ in relevant case law,” and that, in any event, the 
Companies confuse the concept of a party’s burden of proof 
with a court’s standard of review.  (PUC Defendants’ Br. at 
42.) 
 
According to the Companies, Section 28(4) of the 
Restatement is well-established because it provides the basis 
for the axiomatic rule that, “‘even when the parties are the 
same, an acquittal in a criminal proceeding is not conclusive 
in a subsequent civil action arising out of the same event.’”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 44 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. f).)  A comment to Section 
28 of the Restatement explains that, “[t]o apply issue 
preclusion in the cases described in Subsection (4) would be 
to hold, in effect, that the losing party in the first action would 
also have lost had a significantly different burden been 
imposed.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. f.   
 
However, we need not decide whether Pennsylvania 
recognizes the difference-in-burden exception, wherein a 
party that lost on an issue in a first proceeding is nevertheless 
permitted to relitigate the issue in a second proceeding if its 
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burden of proof is lower in the second proceeding.
27
  
Assuming such an exception exists in Pennsylvania law, the 
Companies have failed to show any relevant difference in 
burden here.  They argue that a federal district court reviews 
an issue of federal pre-emption de novo as a question of law, 
whereas the Commonwealth Court afforded deference to the 
PUC’s factual findings underlying the determination that line 
losses are not a transmission cost.  Contrary to the 
Companies’ position, the District Court was not reviewing the 
merits of the PUC Order, so it makes little sense to speak of 
the Companies’ burden of persuasion in the District Court in 
terms of de novo “review.”  What the Companies point to is 
the Commonwealth Court’s use of an allegedly incorrect 
standard of review, not a change in their own burden of proof 
                                              
27
 We note, without holding, that Pennsylvania would 
appear to recognize the difference-in-burden exception under 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4).  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has cited other provisions of 
Section 28 favorably.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeal Bd., 909 A.2d 1261, 1267 n.13, 1270-71 (Pa. 2006) 
(declining to apply collateral estoppel for policy reasons 
consistent with Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28); 
Rue, 713 A.2d at 86 (relying on Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 28(3), (5)).  Moreover, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court recently adopted the difference-in-burden 
exception.  See Weissberger v. Myers, 90 A.3d 730, 735 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2014) (“[T]he fact that the [plaintiffs] proved fraud 
by the preponderance of the evidence in the Bankruptcy Court 
does not establish that they met their burden of proving fraud 
by clear and convincing evidence[,] [so] the collateral 
estoppel doctrine is foreclosed.”).   
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on the merits.  To the extent the Companies complain that the 
Commonwealth Court applied the incorrect standard of 
review, that argument was something to be remedied on 
direct appeal, not something that opens the PUC Order to 
collateral attack in federal court.
28
  See Del. River Port Auth. 
v. Fraternal Order of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 576 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“Error in a prior judgment is not a sufficient ground 
for refusing to give it preclusive effect.”).  The Companies’ 
reliance on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(4) is 
therefore unpersuasive. 
 
 3. Whether the PUC and the 
   Commonwealth Court were without  
  jurisdiction 
 
That brings us to the Companies’ only remaining 
argument that the State Decision lacks any preclusive effect: 
that “[t]he PUC and [the] Commonwealth Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to construe the nature of new 
charges imposed by a FERC transmission tariff.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 24.)  We have recognized that 
Pennsylvania’s preclusion law appears to require subject 
matter jurisdiction in the first proceeding for a decision made 
in that proceeding to have preclusive effect, McCarter v. 
Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1989), and the PUC 
                                              
28
 At oral argument, the Companies also raised the 
concern that Pennsylvania “ha[s] [its] own version of 
Chevron deference” that would not apply in federal court.  
(Tr. at 29:20-24, 30:17-31:8.)  The Companies, however, 
conceded that that argument also relates to a “standard of 
review,” not a burden of proof on the merits.  (Tr. at 31:9-14.) 
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Defendants do not dispute that jurisdiction is a prerequisite to 
the application of issue preclusion in this case.   
 
To be clear, the Companies’ position is that the State 
Decision is “void ab initio for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction and not merely voidable as wrongly decided on 
the merits.”  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 10.)  They argue that 
the PUC and the Commonwealth Court “invaded th[e] 
exclusive federal scheme [of power regulation] by purporting 
to reclassify FERC-mandated interstate transmission rates as 
generation charges.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 32.)  In 
other words, the Companies’ jurisdictional argument is 
premised on the outcome of the merits in the state proceeding 
being adverse to them.  Notably, they do not dispute that the 
Commonwealth Court had jurisdiction to consider the import 
of the filed rate doctrine to the classification of line losses.  
(Id. at 33-34 (“The Companies did not contend that the 
Commonwealth Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
address the Companies’ filed rate doctrine claim.”).)  They 
only dispute that the PUC and the Commonwealth Court had 
jurisdiction to say they lose. 
 
We begin by emphasizing “the limited scope of review 
one court may conduct to determine whether a foreign court 
had jurisdiction to render a challenged judgment.”  
Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & 
Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 706 (1982).  
Generally, when fully and fairly litigated to finality, “a 
tribunal’s determination of its own jurisdiction is accorded 
the same status for issue preclusion purposes as the merits of 
a dispute.”  Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & 
Rockland Utils., 159 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963) (“[A] judgment is 
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entitled to full faith and credit – even as to questions of 
jurisdiction – when … those questions have been fully and 
fairly litigated and finally decided in the court which rendered 
the original judgment.”). 
 
With respect to its jurisdiction, the PUC held: 
 
[I]t is within the [PUC’s] discretion whether 
and how to allocate costs via [the Transmission 
Rider] or otherwise.  And, we believe it is 
unreasonable to suggest that the [PUC] is 
required to rubber stamp recovery of such costs 
simply because they are imposed by PJM, even 
when the Companies voluntarily (and properly) 
sought approval of their recovery from [the 
PUC] acting within its jurisdiction to set just 
and reasonable retail rates for jurisdictional 
transmission and distribution facilities. 
(J.A. at 154.)  In short, the PUC concluded that it had 
jurisdiction not only to consider how to classify line losses for 
the Companies’ retail rate structure but also to resolve the 
classification of costs under the Settlement Agreement as it 
did.  As the Companies have conceded, they challenged the 
PUC’s exercise of jurisdiction on direct appeal to the 
Commonwealth Court and lost.  (See Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 
10 (“The basis for the Companies’ appeal – forum and field 
preemption under the FPA and filed rate doctrine – was 
jurisdictional, not factual.”).)   
 
Under Pennsylvania law, the Commonwealth Court 
has “jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of … the 
[PUC].”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 763(a).  The 
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Commonwealth Court affirmed the PUC, holding that the 
PUC Order “was not inconsistent with FERC precedent, did 
not violate the Filed Rate Doctrine, and did not improperly 
prevent [the] Companies from recovering trapped costs.”  
(J.A. at 191.)  On application for discretionary review to both 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court, the Companies again argued that the state 
tribunals lacked authority to decide the matter adversely to 
the Companies.  (Tr. at 22:6-11 (confirming that the 
Companies’ petitions for discretionary review in the state 
proceeding sought a determination that the PUC lacked 
authority to make the decision that it did).)  Both courts 
denied discretionary review, and the PUC’s determination of 
its own jurisdiction stood as final.  Typically, we would 
afford that determination of jurisdiction preclusive effect, and 
that would be the end of it. 
 
The Companies, however, submit that their argument 
raises a question that we reserved in Crossroads 
Cogeneration v. Orange & Rockland: whether “an exception 
to the rule [of according preclusive effect to a tribunal’s 
determination of jurisdiction] applies in a case … where a 
federal statute … preempts [a] state agency from acting 
altogether.”  159 F.3d at 135.  But we again do not need to 
reach that question because we conclude that, contrary to the 
Companies’ position, the PUC and the Commonwealth Court 
were not divested of jurisdiction to act altogether in the state 
proceeding. 
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a. Whether the state tribunals have  
  been divested of jurisdiction 
 
The Companies maintain that the result of the state 
proceeding is void for lack of jurisdiction, and it is true that 
“[a] void judgment is a legal nullity.”  United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010).  To be 
deemed void, a judgment must be “so affected by a 
fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised even 
after the judgment becomes final.”  Id.  “Federal courts 
considering [whether] a judgment is void because of a 
jurisdictional defect generally have reserved relief only for 
the exceptional case in which the court that rendered 
judgment lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction.”  Id. 
at 271 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) 
(discussing a motion filed under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to render a judgment void). 
 
Showing that a state tribunal lacked even an arguable 
basis for jurisdiction over a federal question is difficult 
because, under the principles of federalism, there is a “deeply 
rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court 
jurisdiction.”  Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990).  
Federal and state law “together form one system of 
jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the 
State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are … courts of 
the same country, having jurisdiction partly different and 
partly concurrent.”  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 
(1876).  The concurrent jurisdiction of the States is “subject 
only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.”  
Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458; see also Del. River Port Auth., 290 
F.3d at 576 (noting that it is well-settled that “[s]tate courts 
may answer federal questions”).  Indeed, “[s]o strong is the 
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presumption of concurrency that it is defeated only in two 
narrowly defined circumstances: first, when Congress 
expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction, and second, 
‘[w]hen a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral 
state rule regarding the administration of the courts.’”29  
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009) (second 
alteration in original) (citations omitted).  The second 
circumstance is not relevant here, so we focus on the first, 
which is typically stated in unmistakable terms: 
 
                                              
29
 There seems to be some tension in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence as to how Congress may remove 
jurisdiction from state courts.  In an earlier case, the Supreme 
Court said, more broadly, that Congress may divest states of 
jurisdiction in three ways: explicit statutory directive, 
unmistakable implication of the statute’s legislative history, 
or clear incompatibility between federal interests and state 
jurisdiction.  Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459-60.  However, the 
Companies do not point to any legislative history of the FPA 
or any “factors indicating clear incompatibility,” such as “the 
desirability of uniform interpretation, expertise of federal 
judges in federal law, [or] the assumed greater hospitality of 
federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.”  Id. at 464 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
Companies would be hard pressed to make any such 
arguments, since, as cited infra, state courts have been 
recognized as properly considering issues arising under the 
FPA.  Therefore, even under Tafflin’s more expansive 
framework, we cannot discern a clear ouster of state 
jurisdiction by Congress. 
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In the standard fields of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, the governing statutes specifically 
recite that suit may be brought “only” in federal 
court, Investment Company Act of 1940, as 
amended, 84 Stat. 1429, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35(b)(5); that the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts shall be “exclusive,” Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, as amended, 48 Stat. 902, 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa; Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 
Stat. 833, 15 U.S.C. § 717u; Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 
Stat. 892, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1); or indeed 
even that the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
shall be “exclusive of the courts of the States,” 
18 U.S.C. § 3231 (criminal cases); 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1333 (admiralty, maritime, and prize cases), 
1334 (bankruptcy cases), 1338 (patent, plant 
variety protection, and copyright cases), 1351 
(actions against consuls or vice consuls of 
foreign states), 1355 (actions for recovery or 
enforcement of fine, penalty, or forfeiture 
incurred under Act of Congress), 1356 (seizures 
on land or water not within admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction). 
Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 471.   
 
The Companies are correct that the FPA grants FERC 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters, but the relevant 
question here is whether Congress divested state utility 
agencies or state courts of jurisdiction to hear cases requiring 
an adjudication of the filed rate doctrine’s scope, and the 
answer to that is no.  The FPA plainly leaves a role for states 
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in electricity regulation.
30
  While section 201(b) of the FPA 
grants federal regulatory authority as to “the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,”31 16 
                                              
30
 Our dissenting colleague asserts that Congress, 
through the FPA, “divest[ed] states of jurisdiction to interpret 
FERC orders that define the elements of the rates of 
transmission facilities, such as PJM.”  (Dissenting Op. at 7.)  
The authorities she cites for that proposition, however, are 
two cases reviewing whether FERC had jurisdiction to make 
certain other determinations.  See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 911 F.2d 993, 1001 (5th Cir. 
1990) (“We must decide whether FERC has jurisdiction to 
determine whether [the public utility] acted prudently once 
the … project [at issue to build nuclear reactors] was 
underway.”); N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 95-96 
(reviewing whether FERC’s elimination of a state-mandated 
exception was “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, 
or limitations, or short of statutory right” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C))).  It is neither 
troubling nor surprising that the PUC’s adjudication here 
required the interpretation of FERC orders.  Adjudication of 
the reach of the filed rate doctrine will in some cases 
necessarily involve looking to and interpreting FERC 
decisions. 
31
 “Furthermore, § 205 of the FPA prohibited, among 
other things, unreasonable rates and undue discrimination 
‘with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the 
jurisdiction of [FERC],’ 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a)-(b), and § 206 
gave [FERC] the power to correct such unlawful practices, 16 
U.S.C. § 824e(a).”  New York, 535 U.S. at 7. 
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U.S.C. § 824(b)(1), at the same time, it provides that federal 
regulation is “to extend only to those matters which are not 
subject to regulation by the States,” id. § 824(a).  Thus, in 
enacting the FPA, Congress expressly envisioned a role for 
state utility agencies in electricity regulation, which may well 
require consideration of the import of the filed rate doctrine.  
Cf. Crossroads, 159 F.3d at 135 (“Given the substantial role 
given state utility agencies by Congress in enacting [the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act], we conclude 
Congress did not intend to prevent application of common 
law rules of preclusion.”). 
 
Nevertheless, the Companies submit that the PUC and 
Commonwealth Court so exceeded the scope of their 
authority under the “preemptive force of the federal 
regulatory scheme” of the FPA and the filed rate doctrine that 
those tribunals utterly lacked jurisdiction.  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 29.)  The Companies point out that a federal 
statute or regulation may pre-empt state regulation in three 
ways.  First, under express pre-emption, Congress can pre-
empt state law by explicit statutory language.  Barnett Bank 
of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).  
Second, under field pre-emption, Congress can enact a 
regulatory scheme “so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”  Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  And third, “federal law may be in 
‘irreconcilable conflict’ with state law,” which creates what is 
known as conflict pre-emption.
32
  Id. (internal quotation 
                                              
32
 Field pre-emption and conflict pre-emption can be 
characterized as falling under “implied,” as opposed to 
“express,” pre-emption.  See Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 
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marks and citation omitted).  The Companies have cast their 
net widely, arguing that “[t]his case concerns all three” types 
of pre-emption.
33
  (Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 1.)  Not ones to 
                                                                                                     
367, 374 (3d Cir. 2011).  We recognize, though, “that the 
categories of preemption are not ‘rigidly distinct.’”  Crosby v. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 n.6 (2000) 
(quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 
(1990)). 
33
 At oral argument, we asked the parties to submit 
supplemental briefing on whether pre-emption may be 
waived.  The PUC Defendants argue that the Companies 
waived their pre-emption arguments by entering into the 
Settlement Agreement.  They point to a provision in the 
agreement that provides, in part, that the Companies “agree 
that they shall not initiate or join in any court challenge, 
arising out of the issues resolved by this Settlement, to the 
constitutionality or legality of the Electric Competition Act 
such that would prevent or preclude implementation of this 
Settlement.”  (Supp. App. at 70.)  There may be an argument 
that the Companies, pursuant to that provision, waived their 
ability to bring Count III to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Electric Competition Act as applied.  We need not reach 
that conclusion, though, because, as we have already 
discussed, see supra Part III.A.1, the Companies waived any 
argument that Count III rises or falls separately from Count I 
for purposes of issue preclusion. 
The PUC Defendants also submit that, by fully arguing 
pre-emption in the Commonwealth Court, the Companies 
have waived their ability to raise pre-emption in federal court.  
But that is not a waiver argument related to the Companies’ 
failure to raise an argument when it should have.  It simply 
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shy from emphatic declarations, they submit that the filed rate 
doctrine is “a uniquely sweeping and clear manifestation of 
field preemption” that divests states of jurisdiction to classify 
line losses as generation costs in a retail rate structure.  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 29.)  We cannot concur. 
 
As we have recently noted, pre-emption arguments do 
not ordinarily raise issues of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 
464 n.1 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e must clarify that our prior 
decision did not imply … that Rule 12(b)(1) [of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure] is the right vehicle for ordinary 
preemption arguments.”).  That is because “[p]reemption 
arguments, other than complete preemption, relate to the 
merits of the case.”  Id. (citing In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 
193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Joyce v. RJR 
Nabisco Holdings Corp., 126 F.3d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(pointing out the distinction “between the complete 
preemption doctrine for jurisdictional purposes and ordinary 
preemption, which merely constitutes a defense to a state law 
cause of action”).   
 
While the Supreme Court has said that “[d]octrines of 
federal pre-emption … may in some contexts be controlling” 
over “the general rule of finality of jurisdictional 
determinations,” Durfee, 375 U.S. at 114, this case does not 
                                                                                                     
restates the PUC Defendants’ view that the State Decision – 
having been fully litigated – should bar the Companies from 
relitigating the issue of pre-emption.  We are satisfied from a 
review of the record that the Companies timely raised their 
pre-emption arguments in the District Court.   
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present such an exception.  In the Atlantic City decision on 
which the Companies so heavily rely, FERC required PJM to 
factor marginal line losses into the energy price at each 
location.  Atlantic City I, 115 FERC at 61,473-74.  Certain 
FERC language from that decision certainly does highlight 
the connection between line losses and the transmission of 
electricity.  See, e.g., id. at 61,473 (“As in the case of all 
electric transmission, there is some loss … as … power is 
transmitted from the point of generation to the point of 
delivery.”).  But the agency did not say that line losses should 
be categorized as a cost of transmission, and indeed it made 
comments that can be read as supporting the view that line 
losses could be understood as a factor in electricity 
generation.  It noted, for example, that “[s]uch loss[es] 
result[] in a cost PJM incurs to maintain the level of the 
scheduled power and to deliver it under conditions of system 
reliability.”  Id. at 61,473.34  In the end, the FERC orders that 
the parties point us to require PJM to calculate line losses in a 
certain way but do not make the kind of categorical 
statements that lead to pre-emption and override the finality 
of the state ruling the Companies themselves sought.  That is 
in sharp contrast with a case like Nantahala Power & Light 
Co. v. Thornburg, in which the Supreme Court held that 
FERC’s express allotment of entitlement power to two 
owners of hydroelectric power plants pre-empted a state 
agency’s retail rate-making order allocating entitlement 
power differently.  476 U.S. at 955, 958. 
                                              
34
 We are not suggesting that FERC would endorse 
what the PUC and the Commonwealth Court decided.  Our 
dissenting colleague has ably discussed why that can be 
doubted.  We eschew any comments on the merits beyond our 
observation that there is no definitive FERC ruling. 
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The Companies also try to rely on “complete pre-
emption,” which is jurisprudentially distinct from the three 
“ordinary” types of pre-emption – express, field, and conflict 
pre-emption – described above.  Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. 
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 858 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 
1988); see also Lontz v. Tharp, 413 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 
2005) (“[W]e may not conflate ‘complete preemption’ with 
… ‘ordinary’ preemption.  While these two concepts are 
linguistically related, they are not as close kin 
jurisprudentially as their names might suggest.  Complete pre-
emption is a ‘jurisdictional doctrine,’ while ordinary 
preemption simply declares the primacy of federal law, 
regardless of the forum or the claim.”).  Under complete pre-
emption, “the pre-emptive force of a statute is so 
‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts’” a state-law complaint into a 
federal one.  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 
(1987) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 
65 (1987)).   
 
Complete pre-emption, however, stands as a limited 
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, i.e., the rule that 
“a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a 
federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if 
the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and 
even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the 
only question truly at issue.”  Id.  Complete pre-emption, in 
other words, arises in the context of removal jurisdiction.  It 
serves as a basis for federal jurisdiction over causes of action 
that may appear, on their face, to be based on state law but 
that are in truth only actionable under federal law due to 
Congress’s clear intent “to completely pre-empt a particular 
area of law.”  U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 160 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  It does not resolve 
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whether state tribunals have been wholly divested of 
jurisdiction to hear the federal cause of action.
35
  Cf. Avco 
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 n.2 (1968) 
(recognizing that a state court may retain jurisdiction over an 
action that is completely pre-empted if the defendant does not 
elect to have the case removed to federal court).  The 
Companies have cited no cases to indicate otherwise.  
Perhaps recognizing that the doctrine is not the best vehicle 
for their argument, they did not even raise complete pre-
                                              
35
 We have some doubt that either the FPA or the filed 
rate doctrine effects a complete pre-emption of state law.  
“The Supreme Court has recognized the ‘complete 
preemption’ doctrine in only three instances: § 301 of the 
[Labor Management Relations Act]; § 502(a) of [the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974]; and 
§§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act.”  N.J. Carpenters v. 
Tishman Constr. Corp., -- F.3d --, 2014 WL 3702591, at *4 
(3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).  With respect to whether 
the FPA completely pre-empts state law, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has observed that 
“nearly all of the other courts that have considered the 
question [have] conclude[d] that the [FPA] does not 
completely preempt state law. … [F]ederal law leaves a role 
for state law in wholesale power regulation.”  Ne. Rural Elec. 
Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 707 
F.3d 883, 893, 895 (7th Cir. 2013).  The Seventh Circuit also 
held that the filed rate doctrine does not completely pre-empt 
state law because that doctrine is “properly treated as a 
federal defense rather than an affirmative basis for 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 896. 
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emption, used as a term of art, until oral argument.  (Tr. at 
5:22-24 (saying that field pre-emption and conflict pre-
emption in this case “add up to complete preemption”).)  That 
has the look of a waiver, but even assuming, arguendo, that 
the Companies have not waived their argument, complete pre-
emption has no place in this discussion. 
 
Furthermore, history matters here.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized, without indicating that there were any 
jurisdictional defects, that “state courts have examined th[e] 
interplay [of the filed rate doctrine] in determining the effect 
of FERC-approved wholesale power rates on retail rates for 
electricity.”  Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 964-65; see also Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 574 N.E.2d 650, 655 
(Ill. 1991) (deciding whether a state utility agency’s action 
violated the filed rate doctrine); Me. Yankee Atomic Power 
Co. v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 581 A.2d 799, 804-05 (Me. 
1990) (same); Pa. Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 561 
A.2d 43, 49-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (same).  Binding 
precedent instructs that, “when a state proceeding presents a 
federal issue, even a pre-emption issue, the proper course is to 
seek resolution of that issue by the state court.”  Chick Kam 
Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1988).  Thus, 
despite the Companies’ attempt to craft a way for us to review 
whether the State Decision complies with their interpretation 
of the FPA and the filed rate doctrine, we cannot say that the 
PUC and the Commonwealth Court “lacked even an arguable 
basis for jurisdiction,” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270, to decide 
the merits of classifying line losses for purposes of a retail 
rate structure.  As the PUC and the Commonwealth Court 
were not divested of authority to act altogether, the result of 
the state proceeding is not void on that ground. 
 57 
 
b. Whether the state proceedings 
were an impermissible “collateral 
attack” on a FERC decision 
The Companies also argue that the FPA explicitly 
proscribes the state agencies and courts, as improper forums, 
from resolving the dispute between the Companies and the 
Customer Groups such that the state proceedings were an 
impermissible “collateral attack” on a FERC decision.  The 
United States Supreme Court in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers 
of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320 (1958), held that, pursuant to FPA 
§ 313(b), “Congress … prescribed the specific, complete and 
exclusive mode for judicial review of the Commission’s 
orders,” which consists of direct review by a federal circuit 
court of appeals and, possibly, the United States Supreme 
Court.
36
  Id. at 336.  Direct review of FERC’s orders 
                                              
36
 FPA § 313(b) provides, in relevant part: 
Any party to a proceeding under this chapter 
aggrieved by an order issued by the 
Commission in such proceeding may obtain a 
review of such order in the United States court 
of appeals for any circuit wherein the licensee 
or public utility to which the order relates is 
located … by filing in such court, within sixty 
days after the order of the Commission upon the 
application for rehearing, a written petition 
praying that the order of the Commission be 
modified or set aside in whole or in part. … 
Upon the filing of such petition such court shall 
have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the 
record with it shall be exclusive, to affirm, 
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necessarily preclude[s] de novo litigation 
between the parties of all issues inhering in the 
controversy, and all other modes of judicial 
review.  Hence, upon judicial review of the 
Commission’s order, all objections to the order, 
to the license it directs to be issued, and to the 
legal competence of the licensee to execute its 
terms, must be made in the Court of Appeals or 
not at all. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  Emphasizing that the rule bars 
tribunals – with the exception of federal circuit courts and the 
United States Supreme Court – from hearing direct challenges 
to FERC orders, the Companies claim it shows a 
jurisdictional deficiency with the state proceeding.  Their 
argument is akin to what we have referred to as “forum pre-
emption”: 
                                                                                                     
modify, or set aside such order in whole or in 
part.  … The judgment and decree of the court, 
affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole 
or in part, any such order of the Commission, 
shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme 
Court of the United States upon certiorari or 
certification … . 
16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (emphasis added).  The relevant language 
of that provision has not changed materially since the City of 
Tacoma decision, except that when that opinion issued, 
exclusive jurisdiction attained “[u]pon the filing of [the] 
transcript” from the challenged FERC proceeding.  16 U.S.C. 
§ 825l(b) (1958). 
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When Congress intends a particular forum to 
have exclusive jurisdiction … , that policy 
decision deprives other fora of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  This doctrine of “forum 
preemption” implements Congressional 
determinations that development of the 
substantive law in a particular area should be 
left to a particular administrative agency created 
for that purpose. 
Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 858 F.2d 
936, 943 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n 
v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 388 (1986) (“It is clearly within 
Congress’ powers to establish an exclusive federal forum to 
adjudicate issues of federal law in a particular area that 
Congress has the authority to regulate under the 
Constitution.”). 
 
The Companies argue that, to the extent the Customer 
Groups had any grievances regarding the proposed line 
losses, they could and should have brought their grievances in 
a federal court of appeals on direct appeal of a FERC order, 
rather than waiting to contest the Companies’ proposed rates 
before the PUC in a separate proceeding.  However, the issue 
in the state proceeding – whether the Companies could 
classify line losses as transmission charges – was not an issue 
arising from any FERC order that the Companies have 
identified.  To the extent the Companies complain that the 
Customer Groups should have directly appealed the Atlantic 
City decision, their argument is misplaced.  The Customer 
Groups did not challenge how FERC has mandated PJM to 
calculate its line losses.  If anything, the classification of the 
Companies’ line-loss costs for retail billing was an issue 
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made relevant by the voluntarily agreed-upon terms of the 
Settlement Agreement, which provided different end dates on 
transmission rate caps and generation rate caps.
37
 
 
  c. Conclusion on state jurisdiction 
 
Ultimately, for purposes of jurisdiction, we need not 
resolve whether the Companies are correct that their 
interpretation of line losses is required under FERC’s 
regulatory scheme or that the Commonwealth Court 
improperly deferred to certain aspects of the PUC Order.  Cf. 
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Defense Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1335 
(2013) (“For jurisdictional purposes, it is unnecessary to 
determine whether [the respondent] is correct in arguing that 
only its readings of the [relevant] Rule is permitted under the 
[Clean Water] Act.”); Avco, 390 U.S. at 561 (“Any error in 
granting … relief does not go to the jurisdiction of the court.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 
The Companies have not cited a single instance in 
which a party has been allowed to litigate a substantive issue 
all the way through the state courts and a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and then 
subsequently argue that the state courts lacked jurisdiction in 
the first place.  The closest case is Southern Union Co. v. 
FERC, 857 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1988), in which the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
declined to apply issue preclusion “with its full rigor” and 
                                              
37
 The Companies themselves, who were adversely 
affected by the Atlantic City decision, did not mount any 
challenge to that FERC order. 
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decided that a state court had no power to enforce a damage 
award that effectively awarded a price for interstate gas that 
was under FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.  Id. at 816.  
However, Southern Union is distinguishable because the D.C. 
Circuit’s rationale for not applying issue preclusion rested on 
“the distinct possibility that the [United States Supreme] 
Court may have declined to issue … [a] writ [of certiorari] in 
deference to the pendency of the proceedings [in FERC].”  Id.  
We have no such indication here prompting us to set aside the 
result of a state proceeding that has been litigated to finality 
and denied review by the United States Supreme Court.
38
 
 
The Companies also cite several Supreme Court 
decisions in which actions by state utility agencies were held 
to be pre-empted by FERC actions.  See Entergy La., Inc. v. 
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003); Miss. Power & 
Light, 487 U.S. at 356-57; Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 955.  But 
those decisions were all made on direct review from state 
agency decisions.  Entergy, 539 U.S. at 49-50; Miss. Power & 
Light, 487 U.S. at 373-75; Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 970-72.  
Here, the United States Supreme Court denied discretionary 
review, rendering the State Decision final.  We have held that, 
“[i]f [a state tribunal] answered federal questions erroneously, 
it remained for state appellate courts, and ultimately for the 
United States Supreme Court, to correct any mistakes.  Error 
in a prior judgment is not a sufficient ground for refusing to 
                                              
38
 To be clear, we agree with our dissenting colleague 
that “[t]he fact that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari 
does not mean that [a] question may not be validly raised in 
federal district court.”  (Dissenting Op. at 14 n.3.)  As 
Southern Union illustrates, there may be exceptions. 
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give it preclusive effect.”39  Del. River Port Auth., 290 F.3d at 
576.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Entergy, Mississippi 
Power & Light, and Nantahala support the conclusion that 
any error in the application of the filed rate doctrine should 
have been corrected on direct appeal of the PUC Order. 
 
Moreover, “[t]here is … no reason to believe that 
Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal 
right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already 
decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state 
proceeding in which he would rather not have been engaged 
at all.”  San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 
343 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Here, the Companies have even less reason to complain, as 
they affirmatively chose to litigate their case through the state 
system.  They admit that “[t]here was nothing preventing 
                                              
39
 Although we have no occasion to revisit the 
substance of the PUC Order, it is worth noting that FERC has 
gone to some lengths to reserve to state agencies various 
issues regarding the potential recovery of retail costs.  See 
Exelon Corp. v. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., EL05-49-000, EL05-
49-001, 117 FERC ¶ 61,176, p. 61,876 (Nov. 9, 2006) 
(stating that “issues involving potential recovery of costs 
from retail customers are within the province of the state” and 
that, in approving a settlement, FERC was “not specifically 
endorsing … characterizations” of the charges as transmission 
related);  Va. Elec. & Power Co., ER08-1540-000, 125 FERC 
¶ 61,391, p. 62,845 (Dec. 31, 2008) (approving tariff 
revisions but leaving “the issue of whether, or under what 
circumstances, [wholesale] costs may be recovered in retail 
rates” to the state). 
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[them] from going to FERC” and that, had they obtained a 
favorable ruling from FERC, they could have enforced it.  
(Tr. at 7:3-8:9; see also id. at 21:8-19 (stating that the 
Companies could go to FERC, even at this point).)  In other 
words, the Companies chose their forum for litigation and 
lost.  As the Supreme Court has stated, 
 
[p]ublic policy[] … dictates that there be an end 
of litigation; that those who have contested an 
issue shall be bound by the result of the contest; 
and that matters once tried shall be considered 
forever settled as between the parties.  We see 
no reason why this doctrine should not apply in 
every case where one voluntarily appears, 
presents his case and is fully heard, and why he 
should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter 
concluded by the judgment of the tribunal to 
which he has submitted his cause. 
Durfee, 375 U.S. at 111-12 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).
40
 
                                              
40
 Our dissenting colleague believes that the policy 
interests in pre-emption outweigh those in applying issue 
preclusion.  Even if her view of those policy interests were 
correct, however – and that is something as to which we make 
no further comment – the premise of her argument about pre-
emption is problematic, for reasons we have noted already.  
She asserts that FERC has spoken in a binding way as to the 
classification of line losses.  We respectfully disagree.  While 
FERC has ruled on the method that PJM must use to calculate 
line losses, no one has presented to FERC the issue presented 
here, i.e., how line losses should be categorized for billing 
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The Companies could have withdrawn their federal 
issues from the state proceeding and brought them in federal 
court, as has been done before.  See Ky. W. Va. Gas v. Pa. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 837 F.2d 600, 604 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(noting that a gas utility that had appealed a PUC denial of a 
pass-through rate to the Commonwealth Court had withdrawn 
its constitutional claims from the state proceeding and 
brought them in federal court).  The only reason the 
Companies proffered for not withdrawing their federal pre-
emption issues was that they had to keep those issues before 
the Commonwealth Court to complete “[t]he legislative 
process.”  (Tr. at 23:1-2.)  As we have explained, however, 
the state proceeding was a judicial process, not a legislative 
one, and the Companies’ excuses now for not pursuing their 
claims in federal court in the first instance have the ring of 
post-hoc rationalization.
41
 
 
                                                                                                     
purposes, especially in light of a settlement agreement of the 
sort involved in this case.  (At least no one has directed our 
attention to such a FERC order.) 
41
 In their supplemental briefing, the Companies argue 
that “[i]f the state court found the FERC tariff and precedent 
unclear, it should have certified the question to FERC itself.”  
(Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 3.)  That, however, is immaterial 
because “[t]he relevant question … is not whether the [party] 
has been afforded access to a federal forum; rather, the 
question is whether the state court actually decided an issue 
of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment.”  San Remo, 
545 U.S. at 342. 
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In the end, we are compelled to reject the Companies’ 
efforts to pose their merits-based pre-emption arguments – 
the same ones that were rejected in the State Decision – as 
jurisdictional arguments.  They would like, as the saying 
goes, to have it both ways – if they had obtained approval to 
charge their customers line-loss costs as a transmission cost, 
the PUC and the Commonwealth Court would have had 
jurisdiction to approve their proposed rates; otherwise, as they 
perceive it, the PUC and the Commonwealth Court must lack 
jurisdiction, and the Companies get a “do-over” with a clean 
slate in federal court.  It is the classic “heads I win, tails you 
lose” approach to dispute resolution.42  (Tr. at 5:9.)  And it 
must fail because there is no sound justification for a rule that 
provides for jurisdiction in a state tribunal only when a pre-
ordained merits outcome is reached by that tribunal. 
 
                                              
42
 At oral argument, the Companies conceded that they 
were taking such a position.  (Tr. at 5:8-19 (“THE COURT: 
So your position is really a heads I win, tails you lose 
position? … [COUNSEL FOR THE COMPANIES]: Well, 
that’s the … characterization that the … opposing side put in 
their briefs[,] … but it’s accurate.”).)  They tried to distance 
themselves from that characterization on rebuttal but simply 
highlighted their position that, again, the state had to decide 
in their favor on the merits.  (Id. at 59:13-17 (“This is not a 
heads I win, tails you lose situation, really … .  It’s a … heads 
we all win if the State follows federal law, and tails we all 
win if … the State follows federal law.”).) 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The Companies chose to challenge the PUC Order on 
direct appeal, and they must abide by the result.
43
  The 
operative concern before us is not whether the result of the 
state proceeding “got it right” but whether the Companies 
litigated the merits of the underlying issues legitimately and 
to finality.  They did.  To refuse to give the State Decision 
any preclusive effect would be a violation of the Full Faith 
and Credit Statute, which we cannot endorse.  Cf. 
Underwriters Nat’l, 455 U.S. at 694 (concluding that a state 
court’s refusal to accord preclusive effect to another state’s 
prior judgment was a violation of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and its implementing federal statute). 
 
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal 
of the Companies’ amended complaint. 
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 Because all of the Companies’ claims in this action 
are foreclosed by the doctrine of issue preclusion, we need 
not reach matters of claim preclusion, abstention, or judicial 
estoppel. 
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Metropolitan Edison, et. al. v. PA Public Utility Commission, 
et. al. 
 
No. 13-4288 
_________________________________________________ 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
 
I do not dispute that the federal courts are precluded 
from reviewing a state court decision applying filed rates.  
However, I disagree with the majority that this is what is at 
issue.  The issue here is whether the Commonwealth Court’s 
misinterpretation of FERC orders, defining a component of a 
rate, is subject to collateral attack in federal court.  I would 
hold that it is.   
 
Contrary to the Commonwealth Court’s assessment 
that the FERC orders in question are ambiguous, FERC has 
clearly classified the component “line loss” as a transmission 
related cost.  Atl. City Elec. Co. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC 
(Atlantic City I), 115 FERC ¶ 61,132 (2006); Atl. City Elec. 
Co. v. PJM Interconnection, LLC (Atlantic City II), 117 
FERC ¶ 61,169 (2006) (denying rehearing of Atlantic City I); 
Pa.–N.J.–Md. Interconnection (PJM Interconnection I), 81 
FERC ¶ 61,257 (1997); Pa.–N.J.–Md. Interconnection (PJM 
Interconnection II), 92 FERC ¶ 61,282 (2000) (denying 
rehearing and granting clarification of PJM Interconnection 
I).  I therefore respectfully dissent.    
 
I. Background  
2 
 
The dispute here starts in June 2007, when PJM, a 
facility that transmits wholesale electricity over an interstate 
grid, implemented a new pricing scheme.  Atlantic City I, 115 
FERC ¶ 61,132.  This change resulted in an additional 
amount of over $250 million being charged for line loss to the 
Companies when they purchased power from PJM to be 
resold at retail.  Line loss is the power lost as electricity is 
transmitted over a distance.  The Companies sought 
permission from the PUC to pass this line loss expense along 
to their retail ratepaying customers.  The PUC denied the 
request.  The PUC held that the line losses were related to the 
cost of generation, and that the Companies had agreed to 
postpone any increase in generation costs until 2010.  The 
Companies appealed to the Commonwealth Court arguing 
that the new charges are related to transmission costs.  The 
Commonwealth Court affirmed the PUC’s determination 
reasoning that the PUC’s classification was permissible 
because FERC has not expressly classified “line loss” as a 
transmission related cost.  Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Pa. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n, 22A.3d 353, 365.  The Commonwealth 
Court is incorrect.  FERC has clearly classified line losses as 
a transmission related cost.  As a consequence, the 
Commonwealth Court lacked jurisdiction to interpret the 
FERC orders.     
 
To understand these issues, I will go back to the 
enactment of the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the ensuing 
FERC oversight of the interstate transmission of electric 
power.  In 1927, the Supreme Court held that the sale of 
electricity in interstate commerce falls under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Congress.  Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro 
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).   In response, 
Congress enacted the FPA, “which authorized federal 
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regulation of the interstate sale of electricity, and created a 
new independent agency, the Federal Power Commission 
(precursor to FERC), to administer the statute.”  N.J. Bd. of 
Pub. Utils. v. FERC, 744 F.3d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 2014).   The 
FPA grants FERC exclusive regulatory authority over “all the 
facilities for such transmission or sale of electricity,” but 
reserves for the states regulatory authority over “facilities 
used for the generation of electric energy.”  Id. (citing 16 
U.S.C. § 824).  In addition, the FPA tasks FERC with 
ensuring that “[a]ll rates and charges … subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission … be just and reasonable.”  
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).  FERC’s approach to this task has been 
to review rates proposed by each facility, rather than to 
directly set the rates itself.  N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 
81.   
 
The Companies acquire electricity from PJM and 
deliver it to retail ratepayers.  Id at 82.  Pursuant to the FPA, 
the rate PJM charges the Companies for this transaction is 
regulated exclusively by FERC.  Id.  FERC has reviewed 
PJM’s rates on various occasions.  Relevant here is FERC’s 
review of PJM rates calculated via the locational marginal 
pricing (LMP) methodology, which classifies line losses as a 
transmission related costs.  See PJM Interconnection I, 81 
FERC ¶ 61,257 (1997); see also PJM Interconnection II, 92 
FERC ¶ 61,282 (2000); see also Atlantic City I, 115 FERC 
¶ 61,132 (2006); see also Atlantic City II, 117 FERC ¶ 61,169 
(2006). 
 
In PJM Interconnection I, FERC approved a proposal 
by PJM to begin calculating rates based on the LMP 
methodology.  Id. 81 FERC ¶ 61, 257.  The issue to be 
decided by this ruling was the allocation of the additional cost 
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to transmission caused by congestion of demand in certain 
areas.  FERC summarized the purpose and mechanics of the 
LMP as follows:   
 
The Commission accepted, with certain 
modifications, the Supporting Companies’ 
locational marginal pricing (LMP) model for 
calculating and recovering congestion costs. 
LMP is defined as the marginal cost of 
supplying the next increment of electric demand 
at a specific location on the electric power 
network, taking into account both generation 
and marginal cost and the physical aspects of 
the transmission system.  When the PJM system 
is unconstrained, there is a single market 
clearing price for hourly energy equal to the 
marginal cost of meeting the last increment of 
demand. When transmission constraints occur 
on the PJM system, the marginal cost of energy 
varies by location because not all supply can be 
delivered to all demand. The differences 
between the LMPs at different locations 
represent congestion costs. 
 
PJM Interconnection II, 92 FERC at p. 61,952.  In other 
words, the LMP accounted for two components, (1) 
generation and (2) transmission constraints, and at this time 
transmission constraints consisted of only transmission 
congestion.  The generation component pertained to the cost 
of providing electricity absent transmission constraints.  The 
transmission constraints component pertained to the 
additional costs incurred to meet demand of providing 
electricity in congested areas, which increases as congestion 
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in an area increases.  Accordingly, calculation of this cost 
creates an incentive for PJM to consider methods for 
alleviating congestion and “encourage[d] efficient use of the 
transmission system.”  PJM Interconnection I, 81 FERC at p. 
62,253.  For example, billing for congestion will “send price 
signals that are likely to encourage efficient location of new 
generating resources, dispatch of new and existing generating 
resources, and expansion of the transmission system.”  Id. 
 
In Atlantic City I, FERC issued an order requiring PJM 
to account for a third component in the LMP, “transmission 
line losses.”  Id. 115 FERC ¶ 61,132.  The “transmission line 
loss” component pertains to the additional costs incurred to 
compensate for the “loss of the scheduled megawatts as the 
power is transmitted from the point of generation to the point 
of delivery.”  Id.  at p. 61,474.  In other words, the longer the 
distance that electricity travels across a power line, the greater 
the loss of power, creating the additional cost necessary to 
compensate for the power lost in transmission, i.e., line loss.  
 
Prior to Atlantic City, “transmission line losses” were 
recovered under an average loss method.  Id. at 61,473.  The 
average loss method calculated losses separately from the 
LMP via an uplift charge, distributing losses equally among 
all loads.  Id.  In other words, customers in nearby locations 
paid the same amount as customers in more distant locations 
– the cost of the lost power being distributed equally among 
all customers.  In Atlantic City, FERC mandated that PJM 
implement the marginal loss method, in which “the effect of 
losses on the marginal cost of delivering energy is factored 
into the energy price (i.e., the Locational Marginal Price, or 
the LMP) at each location.”  Id. at 61,474.  Under this 
method, the cost of line losses increases as the distance 
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between generator and user increased.  Id.  Akin to 
calculating congestion costs, calculating line losses is an 
incentive to PJM to use the transmission grid more 
efficiently.  For example, in an effort to decrease the costs of 
line loss, PJM will consider distance in determining “which 
generators to dispatch to meet its loads.”  Id. 1   
 
Pertinent here, PJM implemented the marginal loss 
method in June 2007, resulting in new charges to the 
Companies, reflecting the cost of transmitting power over 
long distances.  The Commonwealth Court, in affirming the 
PUC, misinterpreted the above mentioned FERC orders, 
holding these orders to be ambiguous.  On this basis, the court 
denied the Companies’ appeal to pass these costs on to retail 
ratepayers.   
 
II. Preclusive Effects of the Commonwealth’s 
Determination 
 
How we frame the question presented in this case 
matters a great deal.  The Companies do not question that the 
Commonwealth Court can review rates to be charged to retail 
customers, taking into account the interstate rate charged by 
PJM.  Rather, the Companies ask us to review the 
Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of one of these 
elements of the PJM rate, the charge for “line loss” as defined 
in the FERC orders.   
                                              
1
  In a separate order, FERC noted that prior to the 
implementation of the marginal loss method, “[l]osses were 
not included in the calculation of LMPs, and thus, were not 
recovered in the LMP energy prices collected from loads.”  
Black Oak Energy, LLC, 122 FERC ¶ 61,208 (2008). 
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The FPA clearly divests states of jurisdiction to 
interpret FERC orders that define the elements of the rates of 
transmission facilities, such as PJM.  See New Orleans Pub. 
Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 911 F.2d 993, 1001 
(5th Cir. 1990) (“Nantahala and Mississippi Power and Light 
reaffirmed the well-established principle that if FERC has 
jurisdiction over a subject, states cannot have jurisdiction 
over it”); see also N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 744 F.3d at 82 
(FERC has jurisdiction over rates set by PJM).  It is true that 
the states have flexibility in reviewing rates.  However, once 
FERC has defined an element of a rate, the states cannot 
redefine it.
2
  The Commonwealth Court acknowledged as 
much in its ruling on this matter.  According to the court, 
“[b]ecause FERC’s opinions have not expressly stated that 
line loss costs are transmission costs, there is no direct 
conflict between the Commission’s Order and FERC.”  
Metropolitan Edison Co., 22 A.3d at 365.  It is the 
Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that there was no conflict 
here with FERC that is at issue.  As explained in depth below, 
FERC has clearly defined the element of “line loss,” and 
therefore, the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation is 
preempted.   
                                              
2
  It is FERC’s prerogative to determine the elements that 
go into a filed rate.  In Nantahala the element in question was 
the percentage of entitlement power to be allocated between 
two utilities.  In the present case, the element is “line loss” 
and its classification by FERC as an element of transmission.  
Once FERC has spoken on the definition of any such element, 
the matter is preempted.  The states may not then dispute that 
classification. The Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that 
there was no conflict here with FERC is invalid for the 
reasons set forth above.   
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As the majority indicates, we are not bound by 
preclusion when “Congress expressly ousts state courts of 
jurisdiction.”  Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 771 (2009).  
Therefore, preclusion does not apply here. 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a 
state-court judgment is subject to collateral attack when “the 
policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed 
by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond its 
jurisdiction.”  Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 n.12 (1963) 
(quoting Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 451(2) 
(Supp. 1948)).  In Travelers Indemnity, Co. v. Bailey, the 
Court provided similar guidance, noting that collateral attack 
is warranted under circumstances where “[a]llowing the 
judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority 
of another tribunal or agency of government[.]”  557 U.S. 
137, 153 n.6 (2009).  Additionally, this Court has noted: 
 
When Congress intends a particular forum to 
have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
rights of the parties in a particular situation, that 
policy decision deprives other fora of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  This doctrine of “forum 
preemption” implements Congressional 
determinations that development of the 
substantive law in a particular area should be 
left to a particular administrative agency created 
for that purpose.    
 
Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. 
Co., 858 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 1988).  
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Here, it is clear that the policy interests in preemption 
outweigh the policy interests of applying issue preclusion.  
Allowing the Commonwealth Court’s judgment to stand, 
without clarification, substantially infringes upon FERC’s 
exclusive authority over its own orders.  Furthermore, the 
Commonwealth should not be permitted to use filed rates as a 
pretense for construing FERC orders solely to benefit retail 
ratepayers, the constitutents of the PUC.  Therefore, the 
Commonwealth Court’s assessment of FERC orders, as 
ambiguous, is subject to collateral attack.   
 
III. Commonwealth’s Review of FERC Orders 
The Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the FERC 
orders “do not unambiguously state that [line losses] are 
transmission related” is flatly contradicted by FERC’s 
persistent use of the term “transmission line losses” 
throughout the orders of Atlantic City I and Atlantic City II.  
Metropolitan Edison Co., 22 A.3d at 356; see 115 FERC ¶ 
61,132; see also 117 FERC ¶ 61,169.  These repeated 
references explicitly classify “line losses” as related to 
“transmission.”   
 
Furthermore, the language quoted by the court to 
illustrate ambiguity does nothing of the sort.  According to 
the Commonwealth Court, FERC associated line losses with 
both transmission and generation.  Metropolitan Edison Co., 
22 A.3d at 365.  First, the court referred to FERC’s statement 
that “marginal losses are a part of the payment for 
transmission service.”  Id. (quoting 117 FERC at p. 61,863).  
Then, the court referred to language in Atlantic City I and 
Atlantic City II that seemingly associated line loss with the 
cost of generation.  According to the Commonwealth Court: 
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FERC stated “locational marginal prices [ (how 
line losses are calculated) ] are at the core of the 
PJM pricing methodology, because marginal 
prices send the proper price signals about the 
cost of obtaining generation.”  FERC then 
explained how line loss costs impact a utility’s 
decision regarding from which generator to 
purchase energy.  Similarly, in Atlantic City I, 
FERC noted that requiring PJM to charge for 
line loss on a locational marginal basis “ensures 
that each customer pays the proper marginal 
cost price for the power it is purchasing” and 
that, in using marginal pricing, “PJM would 
change the way that it dispatches generators by 
considering the effects of losses.”  
 
Id. (quoting Atlantic City I, 115 FERC at p. 61,478; Atlantic 
City II, 117 FERC at pp. 61,862, 61,863).  The court was 
misguided.   
 
In these statements, FERC simply illustrated the 
transmission related incentives that arise when line losses are 
calculated into the LMP.  When line loss costs are calculated, 
PJM will attempt to shorten the route of delivering electricity 
by choosing the generators that are closest to the customers.  
Thus, this calculation encourages PJM to use the transmission 
system more efficiently.  Atlantic City I, 115 FERC at 61,478.   
 
Furthermore, FERC has indicated that similar 
incentives arise when congestion is calculated into the LMP, 
a cost that both the PUC and the Commonwealth Court have 
found to be related to transmission.  PJM Interconnection I, 
81 FERC at p. 62,253; Metropolitan Edison Co., 22 A.3d at 
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356.  FERC noted that calculating congestion costs would 
“send price signals that are likely to encourage efficient 
location of new generating resources, dispatch of new and 
existing generating resources, and expansion of the 
transmission system.”  PJM Interconnection I, 81 FERC at p. 
62,253.  Accordingly, the calculation  “encourage[s] efficient 
use of the transmission system.”  Id.  It is noteworthy that 
neither the PUC nor the Commonwealth Court found this 
statement to be ambiguous in their finding that congestion 
was related to transmission, and not generation.    
   
Finally, the Commonwealth Court referred to language 
in PJM Interconnection I and PJM Interconnection II that 
seemingly associated line loss with the cost of generation.  
Metropolitan Edison Co., 22 A.3d at 365.  According to the 
court, “FERC did refer to the amount of line losses as being 
related to transmission; however, it also indicated that ‘the 
price of line losses is related to generation, and the cost of 
generation is determined by LMP.’”  Id. (quoting PJM 
Interconnection, 92 FERC at p. 61,960).  The court took this 
statement out of context.   
 
At the time PJM Interconnection was decided, the 
LMP calculated two cost components, generation and the 
transmission constraints of congestion.  PJM Interconnection 
II, 92 FERC at 61,952.  In PJM Interconnection II, FERC 
noted, “[w]hen transmission constraints occur on the PJM 
system, the marginal cost of energy varies by location 
because not all supply can be delivered to all demand.”  Id.  
Meanwhile, generation refers to the baseline cost for 
providing electricity absent transmission constraints, which 
does not vary by location.  Id.  At the time, line losses were 
not associated with transmission constraints, but rather, were 
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calculated via an uplift charge.  Atlantic City I, 115 FERC at 
61,473.  Thus, like generation, line losses did not vary by 
location.  It is therefore understandable why FERC, at that 
time, might categorize line losses with generation, as opposed 
to transmission. 
 
However, under LMP, the Commonwealth Court’s 
assessment of FERC orders as ambiguous is misplaced.  It is 
clear that in conjunction with LMP, FERC has consistently 
classified line loss as a transmission related cost.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In focusing on the Companies’ attempt to have us 
review the Commonwealth’s substantive determination under 
the filed rate doctrine, the majority misses the forest for the 
trees.  The state may not improperly interpret a matter outside 
of its jurisdiction when the matter has been left to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of FERC.
3
  Because our review is not 
                                              
3
  From the beginning the Companies have taken the 
position that this is a matter that can only be determined by 
FERC.  And, in essence, this is the question asked by the 
Companies in their petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court:   
 
The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§824 
et seq., grants the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) “exclusive authority to 
regulate the transmission and sale at wholesale 
of electric energy in interstate commerce.” New 
England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 
U.S. 331, 340 (1982). A regional transmission 
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organization (“RTO”) implementing its federal 
tariff charged petitioners for “transmission line 
losses” - the energy that dissipates when 
electricity is transmitted through wires. 
Although it was undisputed that the RTO 
imposed those charges as a cost of transmission, 
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 
and the court below barred petitioners from 
recovering those federally imposed costs in 
retail rates by ruling that “transmission line 
losses” are generation costs (a cost of producing 
electricity), not transmission costs. 
Notwithstanding the filed rate doctrine, they 
deemed it irrelevant that the RTO had imposed 
the charges as “transmission” costs. They held 
that state regulators were free to recategorize 
the charges because FERC had not 
“unambiguously” or “explicitly” declared that 
“transmission line losses” are “transmission 
costs.” The questions presented are: 
1. Whether, contrary to a decision of the 
Fifth Circuit, the Federal Power Act and filed 
rate doctrine permit a state public utility 
commission to deny recovery of FERC-
mandated charges by classifying those costs 
differently from the entity responsible for 
administering the federal tariff on the ground 
that the tariff and FERC's orders do not 
“unambiguously” or “explicitly” foreclose the 
State's chosen classification. 
2. Whether, contrary to a decision of the 
D.C. Circuit, “transmission line losses” reflect 
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precluded and FERC has clearly spoken, I respectfully 
dissent.  Thus, I conclude that this matter should be remanded 
to the District Court with instructions to issue an order 
enjoining the PUC and its Commissioners from asserting 
jurisdiction to define line losses in any manner other than is 
provided by FERC, i.e., that “marginal losses are part of the 
payment for transmission service.”   Atl. City Elec. Co., 117 
FERC at 61,858. 
                                                                                                     
the costs of generating electricity rather than the 
costs of transmitting it. 
 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. 
Util. Comm'n, 133 S.Ct. 426 (No. 12-4) (emphasis added).  
The fact that the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari does 
not mean that this question may not be validly raised in 
federal district court.  Cf. White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 767 
(1945) (“A denial of certiorari by this Court in such 
circumstances does not bar an application to a federal District 
Court for the relief, grounded on federal rights, which the 
Supreme Court of Illinois has denied.”). 
 
 
